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Abstract 
 
  In the first essay titled “Shareholder Coordination, Information Diffusion and Stock 
Returns”, we show that the quality of information sharing networks linking firms’ institutional 
investors has stock return predictability implications. First, we demonstrate that firms with high 
shareholder coordination experience less local comovement and less post earnings announcement 
drift, consistent with the notion that coordination improves firms’ information environment. We 
then document that the stock return performance of firms with high shareholder coordination 
leads that of firms with low shareholder coordination, supporting the view that coordination acts 
as an information diffusion channel. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that 
the market does not readily recognize the superior quality of high shareholder coordination firms 
and prices it gradually through the trading of sophisticated institutional investors, thereby 
causing future returns to be positively associated with shareholder coordination. 
 In the second essay titled “Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness”, 
we find that stock prices of firms with better information sharing networks linking institutional 
shareholders exhibit higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. This positive relation between 
shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness is mainly driven by coordination 
among dedicated and independent institutions and exists even after accounting for endogeneity. 
We further show that institutional trading serves as an information diffusion channel that 
strengthens the relationship of shareholder coordination with price informativeness. Overall, our 
 vi 
results indicate that a higher degree of shareholder coordination leads to more informative stock 
prices by encouraging the collection of and trading on private information.  
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Shareholder Coordination, Information Diffusion and Stock Returns 
 
1. Introduction 
 Firms with good corporate governance are less prone to information asymmetries and 
should be less difficult for outside investors to analyze. Institutional investors are instrumental in 
shaping corporate governance and are generally regarded as important promoters of sound 
corporate policies, transparency (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2005)), and stock price 
informativeness (Piotroski and Roulstone (2004)). However, since institutional investors are not 
a homogeneous group, but rather a collection of clusters of institutions with different investment 
orientations and horizons, their ability to improve corporate governance and firms’ information 
environment relies not just on their mere size and resources, but also on their capacity to share 
information with other institutional shareholder.
1
 The transmission of value relevant information 
across the set of a firm’s institutional investors can be greatly facilitated by the strength of 
professional and social networks that may exist among institutions. There is recent evidence 
(Huang (2011, 2012), Kim, Kim, Pantzalis and Wang (2013)) suggesting that coordination 
among institutions improves corporate governance. What remains an unexplored question, and 
the core emphasis of this paper, is whether the strength of information sharing networks 
facilitating coordination among institutional investors has return predictability implications. The 
                                                          
1
 The alignment in institutions’ monitoring practices is catching practitioners’ and researchers’ attention. For 
example, McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) provide survey evidence that 59% of institutional investors among 
respondents consider coordination with other institutional investors to improve monitoring their managers. Huang 
(2011, 2012) find that shareholder coordination has a positive and significant impact on the market for corporate 
control and corporate governance. Kim, Kim, Pantzalis and Wang (2013) find that firms with high shareholder 
coordination have better earnings quality and stronger stock price informativeness. 
 2 
notion that coordination among institutional investors can help predict returns relies on the 
premise that institutional investors’ information sharing network can be viewed as an 
information flow channel that allows market value relevant information to be transmitted to 
stock prices of firms lacking shareholder coordination after it has been impounded in stock prices 
of peer firms enjoying shareholder coordination.
2
 
We begin our investigation by demonstrating that institutional shareholder coordination 
improves investors’ information environment. Specifically, we show that firms with high (low) 
shareholder coordination experience weak (strong) local comovement and post-earnings 
announcement drift, consistent with the notion that coordination reduces frictions in public 
information processing and encourages the collection of and trading on private information.
3
 
Having established that the degree of institutional shareholder coordination is associated 
with the quality of information environment, we proceed to examine whether shareholder 
coordination serves as an information diffusion channel. We posit that firms with high levels of 
institutional shareholder coordination have stronger information sharing networks that accelerate 
the diffusion of information relative to the case of firms with low levels of coordination. If 
higher (lower) shareholder coordination proxies for less (more) frictions in the process of 
information incorporation, then value relevant information would be impounded first in prices of 
firms with higher shareholder coordination and then with delay in prices of firms with lower 
shareholder coordination.
4
 Therefore, we hypothesize that shareholder coordination effectively 
                                                          
2
 Throughout this paper we use the terms “institutional shareholder coordination”, “shareholder coordination”, and 
“coordination” interchangeably. 
 
3
 Jin and Myers (2006) find that opaque stocks are associated with high stock price synchronicity. Zhang (2006) 
argues that investors underreact more to public information when there is more information uncertainty.  
 
4
 Information processing frictions arise due to the cost of gathering and analyzing information and vary with the 
type of information (qualitative vs. quantitative, or soft vs. hard) as well as with the degree of information 
complexity. There is a long list of studies documenting how information processing frictions affect the way prices 
 3 
plays the role of cross-firm information flow channel and, accordingly, the returns of high 
coordination firms can predict the next period’s returns of otherwise similar, low-coordination 
firms. Consistent with this hypothesis’ prediction, we show that there is a substantial lead-lag 
relation in the cross-section of asset prices between firms with high and low shareholder 
coordination levels.  
To measure the degree of coordination among institutional shareholders, we follow 
Huang (2011, 2012) and devise two proxies that rely on the premise that the likelihood and 
strength of social connections increases with geographic proximity and similarity of values, 
attitudes, and beliefs comprising institutional shareholders’ corporate investment philosophy.5 
Social network literature suggests that social ties and relationships are more likely to develop 
when there is homophily, i.e., the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with others 
driven by familiarity, often rooted in geographic proximity or sharing of common values 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001)). Geographic proximity has been shown to be 
influential in the development of close relationships, such as friendship and marriage (Bossard 
(1932)), in the frequency of communications within firms (Allen (1984)), in the forming of 
interlocked corporate boards (Kono, Palmer, Friedland, and Zafonte (1998)), in dealings among 
floor traders (Baker (1984)), and in investment patterns of venture capital firms (Sorenson and 
Stuart (2001)). In addition to propinquity, studies have shown that social connections are more 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
are updated. For example, Engelberg (2008) and Demers and Vega (2008) show that higher processing costs of 
qualitative information may be responsible for the wedge between quantitative and qualitative information leading 
to more pronounced post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD). Their findings are in line with the predictions of 
Hong and Stein (1999) who model the slow diffusion of information. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) 
show that profitable short sellers are more proficient in processing public information than other less-informed 
traders. Their evidence is consistent with the notion that news interpretation is related to traders’ skill (see also 
Rubinstein (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995)). 
 
5
 The first proxy is the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance among institutional shareholders 
(hereafter COORD_PROX) and the second one is the weighted average correlation among institutions’ portfolios of 
stock holdings (hereafter COORD_PORT). 
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likely when individuals share similar backgrounds, demographic characteristics and values 
(Marsden (1988); McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) among others). 
To generate clean tests of the hypothesis that institutional shareholder coordination acts 
as an information flow channel, we develop our coordination measures by accounting for the fact 
that the degree of institutional shareholder coordination can be strongly correlated with ﬁrm 
characteristics, such as firm size and headquarters’ location. Accordingly, we first estimate 
coordination in a regression model that includes several firm characteristics as independent 
variables and extract the residual. These residual shareholder coordination measures 
(RES_COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PORT) capture the unobservable part of coordination 
and serve as our main variables of interest in the return predictability tests.  
The slow information diffusion hypothesis tests are first performed as they pertain to 
industry-specific information. In this case, the appropriate test assets are industry based 
portfolios. Specifically, at the end of June in each year, we first sort all firms in each of the 
Fama-French 48 industries into 3 size terciles. We then separate each of these industry-size 
portfolios into three shareholder coordination terciles and define firms in the top (bottom) tercile 
as high (low) coordination firms. This sorting technique generates the two sets of our test assets 
(144 high shareholder coordination and 144 low shareholder coordination portfolios) and ensures 
that our results will not be contaminated by the previously documented lead-lag effects in stock 
returns between big and small firms within an industry (Lo and MacKinlay (1990)). After having 
matched each low shareholder coordination portfolio with its corresponding high coordination 
“clone” within each industry-size portfolio, we proceed to calculate clones’ one-month-lagged 
return performance, and rank them into month t-1 return quintiles. Following Cohen and Lou 
(2012), we assign each of the low coordination portfolios to the quintile where its high 
 5 
coordination clone is located. We then calculate the equally and value weighted returns in month 
t of the quintile portfolios consisting of low coordination test assets. We find evidence of strong 
return predictability, consistent with the notion that shareholder coordination serves as an 
information diffusion channel.  
The zero-cost investment portfolio that buys low-shareholder-coordination firms, whose 
corresponding high coordination clones performed best in the prior month, and sells 
low-shareholder-coordination test assets, whose corresponding high coordination clones 
performed worst in the prior month, has a value-weighted return that is above 85 basis points per 
month. We repeat the test using alternate test assets that would be more appropriate in a more 
general setting where the value-relevant information has market-wide rather than 
industry-specific implications. Specifically, we construct two sets (i.e. high and low coordination) 
of 125 portfolios based on the method outlined in Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) 
(hereafter DGTW) which entails combinations of size, book-to-market and momentum quintiles. 
This procedure of building test assets allows us to purge out the effect of common factors on 
stock prices and provides a clean testing ground to investigate how shareholder coordination 
serves as a market-wide information diffusion channel. We document consistent evidence that 
the zero-cost investment portfolio delivers on average an equally-weighted (value-weighted) 
return ranging between 50 and 66 basis points per month, which is an economically sizeable 
effect. Our results also hold in a cross-sectional test setting where we control for other factors, 
such as size, book-to-market, past return and liquidity.  
We also investigate asset pricing implications of shareholder coordination. Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) documented that firms with stronger corporate governance significantly 
outperform firms with weaker corporate governance. Since firms with high shareholder 
 6 
coordination exhibit better corporate governance (Huang (2012)), we conjecture that shareholder 
coordination should be positively related with future stock performance. Consistent with this 
prediction, we find that a zero-cost investment portfolio that is long stocks with high levels of 
coordination and short stocks with low levels of coordination generates significant abnormal 
performance.  
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) point out that one plausible reason for the superior 
return performance of firms with good corporate governance is that investors do not know the 
outcome of high-quality corporate governance and hence cannot price in such information 
immediately. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) document that the lack of investor recognition is the 
main reason for the slow stock prices’ response to information. Giroud and Mueller (2011) 
provide indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis that investors do not recognize the agency 
costs caused by weak corporate governance. To test whether the positive impact of shareholder 
coordination on stock prices is caused by gradual information incorporation, we follow Choi and 
Sias (2012) and use institutional investor demand as a proxy for updates in sophisticated 
investors’ expectations. Our tests reveal that shareholder coordination is positively related with 
subsequent institutional investor demand, supporting the notion that the outcome of improved 
corporate governance is first recognized by sophisticated investors and then only gradually 
incorporated into prices by the rest of the market.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related literature, section 
3 describes the sample and variables construction, section 4 contains the empirical results, and 
section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
  
 7 
2. Relation to the Existing Literature 
 Our paper contributes to two strands of finance literature. The first strand of literature 
studies return predictability arising from slow information diffusion that results from different 
sources. For example, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) document that returns of small firms are 
correlated with past returns of large firms, but not vice versa. Badrinath, Kale and Noe (1995) 
find that past returns of stocks held by informed institutional traders are positively correlated 
with returns of stocks held by uninformed retail traders. Hou (2007) finds that industry-level 
information diffuses from big firms to small firms within the industry, and confirms that the 
lead-lag effect between large and small firms documented in Lo and MacKinlay (1990) is 
predominantly an intra-industry phenomenon. Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) 
provide evidence that returns on portfolios of stocks followed by many analysts tend to lead 
returns on portfolios of stocks followed by few analysts. Chordia and Swaminathan (2002) find 
that returns on portfolios of stocks with high trading volume lead returns on portfolios of stocks 
with low trading volume.  Recently, Cohen and Lou (2012) document strong return 
predictability from “pseudo-conglomerate” portfolios of easy-to-analyze focused firms to their 
conglomerate peers due to the complexity in processing information related to the latter. Menzly 
and Ozbas (2010) find that stocks that are in economically related supplier and customer 
industries cross-predict each other’s returns. Gao, Moulton and Ng (2013) find lead-lag return 
predictability exists in stocks with common sets of institutional investors and attribute the 
phenomenon to the portfolio reallocations of institutional investors.  
 However, existing studies have largely ignored the role played by the internal mechanism 
of information flow that is the information-sharing network that links institutional shareholders 
of a firm. Our paper contributes to this line of research by documenting how institutional 
 8 
shareholders’ information sharing networks serving as information diffusion channels can 
become drivers of return predictability. Our approach is different from that of Gao, Moulton and 
Ng (2013) in that their paper focuses on return predictability driven by institutional investors’ 
common portfolio reallocations (i.e. an external mechanism), whereas we emphasize the internal 
mechanism of institutional shareholder coordination. 
The second strand of the finance literature that our paper contributes to examines the 
equity pricing implications of corporate governance. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
document that firms with better corporate governance (shareholder rights) have higher firm value 
and better operating performance. An investment strategy that buys firms with strong corporate 
governance and sells firms with weak corporate governance can generate abnormal returns of 8.5% 
per year during their sample period. Cremers and Nair (2005) point out that the internal and 
external governance mechanisms are strong complements in terms of being associated with 
future abnormal returns and firm profitability. Both aforementioned papers propose two potential 
reasons for the positive relation between corporate governance and future firm performance: (1) 
omitted variables bias; and (2) unrecognized agency costs caused by weak governance. Giroud 
and Mueller (2011) rule out the omitted variables bias explanation and provide limited support to 
the second explanation. Our paper, to our knowledge, is the first paper providing direct evidence 
supporting the gradual information incorporation hypothesis in explaining the relation between 
corporate governance and asset prices.  
 
  
 9 
3. Sample and Variables Construction 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
   Our analysis uses stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP), accounting data from Compustat, analyst forecast data from Institutional Brokers’ 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and the institutional holding data from Thomson Reuters F13. Our 
sample period is from January 1994 to December 2010. We apply the following screens to create 
the sample. First, we restrict the sample to institutional shareholders located in the U.S. Second, 
we exclude closed-end funds, Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts, and 
foreign stocks, only retaining stocks with CRSP share code 10 or 11. Third, to ensure that 
accounting information is publicly available before we conduct stock return predictability tests, 
we impose at least a six-month gap between the firm’s fiscal-year ends and the beginning of 
stock return intervals. Last, to further alleviate market microstructure-related concerns, we 
require that the stock price must be greater or equal to five dollars per share at the beginning of 
the holding period.  
 
3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Shareholder coordination. Following Huang (2011, 2012), we construct two 
measures of institutional shareholder coordination: COORD_PROX and COORD_PORT. The 
first measure, COORD_PROX, is constructed as the weighted average geographical distance 
among institutional shareholders of a firm. The rationale behind this measure is that the 
likelihood of casual social interactions and networking increases with geographic proximity (see 
 10 
McPherson et al (2001)). To measure the distance between two institutions, we first identify the 
location of institutions by collecting their headquarter address zip code information from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents (SEC Edgar) and the Nelson’s Directory 
of Investment Managers. We then obtain the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database. Following prior research 
(e.g. Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), we calculate the distance between institution i and j using 
the following standard formula:  
DISTi,j=r arccos{cos(lati)cos(loni)cos(latj)cos(lonj)+cos(lati)sin(loni)cos(latj)sin(lonj)+sin(lati)sin(latj)}  
where DISTi,j is distance in statutory miles, r denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 
3,963 statutory miles), and lat and lon are institution latitudes and longitudes. 
 For each firm-quarter, we calculate the distance of each institutional shareholder and all 
institutional shareholders of the firm, weighted by their respective fractional holdings of the total 
institutional ownership in the firm. We then take the inverse of logarithm-transformed fractional 
holdings weighted-average of these distances across all institutional shareholders of the firm to 
obtain the geographic-proximity-based institutional shareholder coordination measure for each 
firm-quarter. The weighting scheme aims at delivering a more accurate gauge of coordination 
than the simple average of the distances among institutions, because it accounts for the fact that 
institutions with large shareholdings typically have a more substantial impact on corporate 
behavior. Specifically, the geographical-proximity-based institutional shareholder coordination 
measure is designed as follows:  
           (  )   (  ∑  
   
∑          )
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where α is the set of institutional investors,    is the ownership weight of institution i in the 
total ownership held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and         is the 
geographical distance between institution i and j. The logarithm transformation, log (1 + 
weighted-average of geographical distance among institutions) serves the purpose of reducing 
the skewness of distribution for this measure.  
 The second measure, COORD_PORT, is the weighted average correlation between 
institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings. The intuition behind this measure is based on the 
premise that institutions with similar portfolio allocations are more likely to share common 
investment philosophies and therefore also more likely to have developed social links that lead to 
better coordination.
6
 Additionally, stronger connectedness among institutions based on 
similarities in their portfolio allocations may also motivate them to coordinate their monitoring 
efforts and corporate governance roles. To calculate the portfolio correlation between two 
institutional shareholders for each firm-quarter, we first identify the stocks held by each 
institutional investor at the end of each quarter, and then calculate the correlation of the excess 
portfolio weights
7
 on the stocks held by both institutions. For each institutional shareholder of 
the firm, we then calculate the correlation of its portfolio with that of all other institutions, 
weighted by their respective fractional holdings of the total institutional ownership in the firm. 
As in the geographical-proximity-based institutional shareholder coordination measure, we then 
take the fractional holdings weighted-average of these portfolio correlations across all 
                                                          
6
 Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) and Stein (2008) argue that communications among institutional managers facilitate 
the information transmission and affect their investment decisions. Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) find that 
education ties improve the information sharing among mutual fund managers and then their investment. 
 
7
 The excess portfolio weight allocated to stock i in quarter t is given by:       
         
    
    , where      is 
the actual weight assigned to stock i in the institution’s portfolio p in quarter t and      is the weight of stock i in 
the aggregate market portfolio in quarter t. 
 12 
institutional shareholders of the firm to obtain the portfolio-correlation-based institutional 
shareholder coordination measure for each firm-quarter. Specifically,  
           ∑  
   
∑          
   
  
where α is the set of institutional investors,   is the ownership weight of institution i in the total 
ownership held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and         is the 
correlation coefficient of the excess portfolio weight (measured as the actual weight relative to 
the weight in the market portfolio) allocated to common holdings between institutions i and j at 
quarter t. 
      3.2.2 Unobservable shareholder coordination. To derive a more causal link between 
institutional shareholder coordination and other variables of interest, we need to first design a 
prediction model that captures the effect of firm characteristics on institutional shareholder 
coordination. The rationale is that the predicted shareholder coordination is a linear combination 
of firm characteristics and as such it could be endogenously determined. Thus, if firm 
characteristics used to predict shareholder coordination also explain most of the variation in 
return performance, shareholder coordination’s relation to return performance could be explained 
by the notion that coordination simply acts as an aggregate proxy for those firm characteristics. 
Conversely, if the part of shareholder coordination that cannot be explained by firm 
characteristics, i.e. the residual from a prediction model explains most of the variation in the 
variables of interest, it is more likely that we have established a causal relation between them. 
Moreover, the residual measure represents the unobservable part of coordination, i.e. the part that 
the outside investors cannot easily recognize, and from their perspective, a complicated 
 13 
information absorption mechanism. Therefore, intuitively it is more appropriate to conduct the 
analysis based on residual institutional shareholder coordination.   
 To obtain the residual shareholder coordination measure we use a methodology similar 
to that used by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and Nagel (2005) in different contexts. Given the 
fact that there is neither any prior theoretical model nor prior empirical evidence regarding the 
determinants of institutional shareholder coordination, we include a battery of variables that 
reflect firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, accounting performance (ROA) and market 
performance (BM, Beta and BHRET12)) in the prediction model. Considering the way we 
construct institutional shareholder coordination variables, we also include the percentage of 
institutional ownership and institutional ownership concentration to control for their potential 
impact on the degree of shareholder coordination. In addition, we add to the model the location 
of a firm’s headquarters (a city indicator variable 8) because it may have an impact on 
institutional shareholder coordination through two possible mechanisms: first, urban firm 
location provides money managers located in the same city a greater chance to exchange their 
private information, leading to a better coordination among them
9
; and second, the role of threat 
of exit that is magnified when stock liquidity is strong, as is the case in urban firms, may 
intensify the ease of coordination.
10
 Finally, our prediction model is as follows:  
                                                          
8
 If a firm’s headquarters is located in one of the 21 major cities, the city dummy is equal to 1, otherwise 0. We 
obtain the list of the major cities by US Census Bureau population surveys of 1990 and 2000. The full list of the 
cities includes: New York, San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Baltimore, 
Washington, San Diego, Milwaukee, Detroit, Phoenix, Columbus, Indianapolis, Austin, San Antonio, Jacksonville, 
Memphis, and San Jose. 
 
9
 Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) find that a mutual fund manager’s investment decision is more likely to be affected 
by the investment decision of other managers in the same city through the word-of-mouth effects. 
 
10
 Admati and Pfleiderer (2009) argue that through the credible threat of exit, a large shareholder can alleviate the 
agency problem on the basis of its private information about corporate managers’ extraction of private benefits. 
Bharath, Jayaraman and Nagar (2013) provide empirical evidence that exit threats by blockholders that are 
 14 
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 We estimate this cross-sectional regression of coordination every quarter with lagged 
independent variables and obtain coefficient estimations of each controlling variable, which we 
then use to obtain predicted institutional shareholder coordination for each firm and each quarter 
according to the following equation: 
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7 8 9 10 11
             
      _   12  _
_ _
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P COORD a a a a a a a
a a a a a
      
    
(2) 
  After obtaining the predicted shareholder coordination, we obtain the unexplained 
(residual) part for geographical-proximity-based (hereafter RES_COORD_PROX) and 
portfolio-correlation-based (hereafter RES_COORD_PORT) institutional shareholder 
coordination as follows: 
         _-_ _ _ _
est
RES COORD COORD P COORD                        (3) 
 In this paper, we use RES_COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PORT as the main 
shareholder coordination variables. Table 1.1 presents summary statistics for the main variables 
as well as other controlling variables used in the regressions (refer to the caption of Table 1.1 for 
detailed variable definitions). The summary statistics of raw institutional shareholder variables 
are comparable to that in Huang (2011, 2012).  
 Table 1.2 Panel A reports the Fama-MacBeth regression results of the coordination 
prediction model. It is noteworthy that the adjusted R-square for both coordination measures 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
strengthened due to the stock liquidity shocks have a substantial impact on firm value. Loughran and Schultz (2005) 
find that stocks of urban firms are more liquid than those of rural firms. 
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(COORD_PROX, 0.308; COORD_PORT, 0.602) indicates that the controlling variables in the 
prediction model explain a considerable part of variation in the coordination variables. In other 
words, after purging out the effects of relevant determinants, we obtain the pure shareholder 
coordination measures. It is not surprising to see that firm size is significantly and negatively 
related with shareholder coordination in that the visibility of large firms is more likely to attract a 
large number of different types of institutional investors. The positive relation between 
institutional ownership concentration and shareholder coordination indicates that dispersed 
institutional ownership imposes more barriers on the coordination among institutional investors. 
It is interesting and somewhat surprising that location in big cities has a negative impact on 
shareholder coordination. This could be due to a relatively large number of firms located in 
metropolitan cities. The results further suggest that firms’ prior market and accounting 
performance also have substantial effects on shareholder coordination. Table 1.2 Panel B reports 
the correlation matrix for the raw and refined shareholder coordination measures. The Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation between COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PROX is 0.7669 (0.4276), 
indicating that although the two measures are highly correlated, they are not exactly the same, 
which is in line with the view that our prediction model of shareholder coordination successfully 
captures the noisy part in the raw coordination measures. The positive correlation between 
COORD_PORT and RES_COORD_PORT (Pearson=0.6241 and Spearman=0.2692) further 
confirms the above argument. The large correlation between COORD_PROX and 
COORD_PORT (Pearson=0.6550 and Spearman=0.4637), RES_COORD_PROX and 
RES_COORD_PORT (Pearson=0.4498 and Spearman=0.3310) supports the idea that the 
geographical-proximity-based and portfolio-correlation-based coordination measures capture, to 
a large extent, different aspects of the same phenomenon.  
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 Finally, if our measures of institutional shareholder coordination are indeed capturing the 
strength of links between institutions within an information sharing network, they should be 
positively associated with the degree of synchronization in institutional trading. In other words, 
if higher coordination leads to greater harmony of institutional investors’ information sets about 
a particular firm’s stock performance, we should observe greater synchronization across 
institutional shareholders’ trades leading to lower diversity in changes of institutional 
shareholders stakes. We test whether this is indeed the case by examining the relationship 
between our residual coordination measures and the standard deviation of the changes in the 
quarterly stakes of a firm’s different institutional shareholders, controlling for other firm 
characteristics. The results, presented in Panel C of Table 1.2, show a strong relationship 
between coordination and synchronization in institutional trading and provide support for the 
notion that our residual coordination measures are indeed capturing the ability of institutions to 
share market-value relevant information about the firm.       
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Shareholder Coordination and information Environment  
 As mentioned before, shareholder coordination has been shown to improve corporate 
governance and disclosure quality. In this section, we build on this recent evidence and examine 
whether shareholder coordination positively affects firms’ information environment from the 
perspective of outside investors. We conduct this analysis based on local comovement of stock 
returns and post-earnings announcement drift. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document that stock 
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returns exhibit strong local comovement and attribute the phenomenon to the trading pattern of 
local residents whose information sets are effectively segmented from that of outside investors.
11
 
If more transparent information flows to the market, stock prices will reflect more firm specific 
information through the trading of active and sophisticated investors and the local comovement 
of stock returns will be reduced. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms with high shareholder 
coordination have a low degree of comovement with local stocks. To test this hypothesis, 
following Pirinsky and Wang (2006), we first construct local stock return indices for each 
Metropolitan Statistics Area (hereafter MSA) by equally weighting the returns of all stocks 
within each MSA. To obtain the sensitivity of stock returns to local stock return indices, we 
estimate time-series regressions of monthly stock returns on the returns of the corresponding 
local index and the market portfolio for each stock. Specifically, we estimate the following 
model:  
                    , ,
local local market market
i t i i t i t i tR R R                        (4) 
where ,i tR is the monthly return of stock i, 
local
tR is the monthly return of the stock’s 
corresponding MSA local stock returns index, and 
market
tR is the monthly return of the market 
portfolio. All returns are in excess of monthly T-bill rates. To avoid spurious correlations, we 
exclude the return of stock i when we construct the local stock returns indices. After we obtain 
local
i  for each stock, we then regress it on shareholder coordination and other variables that 
capture firm and regional characteristics that have been shown to be correlated with local bias. 
Specifically, we control size (the natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the 
previous year), leverage (the ratio of total debt to asset), MB (market to book ratio equity ratio), 
                                                          
11
 An alternative explanation provided by Pirinski and Wang (2006) is that local comovement is rooted on local 
investors’ preferences toward local stocks stemming from familiarity and/or loyalty.  
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ROA (return on asset), advertising (advertising expenditures), the number of shareholders (the 
natural logarithm of number of shareholders), and IO (institutional ownership) in the regressions. 
Additionally, we include as controls regional characteristics, such as the industry agglomeration 
by MSA (Industry HHI, a Herfindahl index), investment income (the per capita investment 
income in an MSA), and personal income (the per capita personal income in an MSA). 
 The results in Table 1.3 indicate that shareholder coordination has a strong negative 
impact on local comovement. Take RES_COORD_PORT, for example: a 10 percent increase in 
shareholder coordination results in an approximate 6 percentage decline in local beta, ceteris 
paribus. The results still hold after the inclusion of regional characteristics. Consistent with the 
findings in Pirinsky and Wang (2006), we also find a negative effect of size, ROA and industry 
concentration on local beta. In contrast, the institutional ownership coefficient is negative, albeit 
not statistically significant.   
 Next, we examine whether shareholder coordination plays a role in explaining 
post-earnings announcement drift. Earnings surprises are measured as the difference between 
actual earnings as reported by I/B/E/S (ei,q) and consensus earnings forecast (Fi,q), defined as the 
median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 day period prior to the earnings announcement. 
We then normalize the difference by the stock price at the end of the corresponding quarter q
12
: 
                            
, , - 4
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,
-
_
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i q
i q
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UE FERROR
P
                       (5) 
If an analyst made multiple forecasts during a 90-day period, we use the most recent earnings 
forecast. 
                                                          
12
 To avoid the potential rounding issues in I/B/E/S adjusted data described in Payne and Thomas (2003), we use 
the I/B/E/S Unadjusted Detail History data that do not have adjustments for stock splits and stock dividends, and put 
both forecast and actual earnings on the same per share basis to accurately calculate analyst-based earnings surprise 
using the CRSP adjustment factor. 
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 The cumulative abnormal returns over the post-announcement window from day 2 to day 
61 (BHAR[2,61]) are defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the 
announcing firm and that of a size and book-to-market (B/M) matching portfolio over the 
window [2, 61]
13
 in trading days relative to the announcement date. 
                    
6 1 6 1
, , ,
2 2
[2,61] (1 ) (1 )
t t
i q i k p k
k t k t
BHAR R R
 
   
                   (6) 
where
,i kR and ,p kR are the return of firm i and the return of size and book-to-market matching 
portfolio on day k relative to the announcement date t in quarter q. 
 For each quarter from 1994 to 2010, we first perform quarterly sorts based on each firm’s 
earnings surprises. Then for each earnings surprises quintiles in each quarter, we further sort 
stocks into quintiles based on the most recent corresponding shareholder coordination. For each 
shareholder coordination quintile, we calculate the mean cumulative abnormal returns in the 
post-announcement period for the top (most positive, ES5) and the bottom (most negative, ES1) 
earnings surprise quintiles, and the difference in post-announcement cumulative abnormal 
returns between the two extreme earnings surprise quintiles. The spread in post-announcement 
abnormal returns between ES5 and ES1 measures captures underreaction to earnings news as 
reflected in subsequent drift.  
 In Table 1.4, consistent with prior evidence, the spread in the cumulative abnormal return 
over the post-announcement period between extreme earnings surprise quintiles is significantly 
positive, indicating delayed market response to earnings news. If firms with high shareholder 
coordination have a better information environment, the market reaction to the earnings 
announcements will be less delayed. In other words, the post-earnings announcement drift will 
                                                          
13
 Bernard and Thomas (1989) document that the post-earnings announcement drift primarily concentrate on the 60 
trading days period after the earnings announcement.  
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be weaker for firms with higher shareholder coordination than firms with lower shareholder 
coordination. Consistent with our prediction, the spread in mean BHAR[2,61] between good and 
bad earnings news quintiles is largest in the low shareholder coordination quintiles, indicating 
that the lack of coordination is associated with greater underreaction to earnings news. Take 
RES_COORD_PROX, for example: in the top RES_COORD_PROX quintile, the mean 
post-announcement abnormal return spread is small (2.94%), whereas the mean spread in the 
bottom quintile is substantially larger (5.40%). The last row of Table 1.4 reports the difference of 
the spread between top and bottom shareholder coordination quintiles. For both measures of 
shareholder coordination, the differences are statistically and economically significant (for 
RES_COORD_PROX, difference=-2.47% (p-value<0.01); for RES_COORD_PORT, 
difference=-2.79% (p-value<0.01)), supporting the notion that shareholder coordination weakens 
the post earnings announcement drift by delivering more transparent and precise information to 
the market.  
 
4.2 Shareholder Coordination and Information Diffusion  
 In this section, we examine whether shareholder coordination serves as an information 
transmission channel thereby giving rise to lead-lag return phenomena between firms with strong 
and weak information sharing networks. Social network literature suggests that informal ties are 
likely to develop when there is homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to associate and bond 
with others driven by familiarity, often rooted in geographic proximity or the sharing of common 
values (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001)). The stronger the informal ties among 
institutional shareholders, the more likely they are to build up information sharing networks that 
facilitate the diffusion of value relevant information into the market. Accordingly, stock prices of 
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firms with high shareholder coordination will respond faster to information shocks than firms 
with low shareholder coordination. Therefore, we hypothesize that there exists a lead-lag effect 
wherein stock returns of firms with high levels of shareholder coordination will lead those of 
firms with low shareholder coordination.  
 We test the aforementioned return predictability implications of slow information 
diffusion as it pertains to both industry and market-wide information. We start with testing return 
predictability arising from slow diffusion of industry information. At the end of June in each year, 
we first sort firms into 144 portfolios corresponding to the 48 Fama-French industry portfolios, 
each split into 3 size portfolios (i.e., 48×3=144). We further independently sort firms into two 
portfolios based on whether the average residual shareholder coordination over the past four 
quarters was high (i.e., ranking in the top coordination tercile) or low (i.e., ranking in the bottom 
coordination tercile). This sorting technique insulates our results from the previously 
documented intra-industry lead-lag effect that exists between big and small firms (Lo and 
McKinley (1990) and Hou (2007)). We then use the high coordination portfolios as the 
benchmarks and match them with stocks in the low coordination portfolios within each 
industry-size portfolio. The performance of each benchmark portfolio is measured by averaging 
the stock returns of firms each month. Following Cohen and Lou (2012), at the beginning of each 
month (starting in July), we sort stocks in low coordination portfolios into quintiles based on the 
returns of their corresponding high coordination benchmarks in the previous month. The quintile 
portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each month.  
 We employ the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model that includes the market, size, 
book-to-market and momentum factors to examine the risk-adjusted return performance of 
portfolios.  
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            0 1 2 3 4- ( - )
P F M F
m m m m m m m mR R R R SMB HML UMD e                   (7) 
where 
P
mR  is a particular portfolio’s monthly return, 
F
mR  is the one-month Treasury bill rate, 
M
mR  is the value-weighted market return, SMB (small minus big) is the difference between the 
monthly returns of the small and big firms’ portfolios, HML (high minus low) is the difference 
between the monthly returns of high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms’ portfolios, 
and UMD (up minus down) is the momentum factor computed as the monthly return differential 
between a portfolio of winners and a portfolio of losers. For the test of the performance on 
zero-cost investment portfolios, we also use the same four factor model: 
           0 1 2 3 4- ( - )
H L M F
m m m m m m m mR R R R SMB HML UMD e                (8) 
where 
H
mR  is the monthly return of the portfolio with stocks in the top shareholder coordination 
quintile, and 
L
mR  is the monthly return of the portfolio with stocks in the bottom shareholder 
coordination quintile.  
 If shareholder coordination serves as an information diffusion channel, the information 
update in stock prices of high coordination firms should predict the information update in stock 
prices of low coordination firms. We test this prediction in Table 1.5. As we can see, we find 
strong evidence consistent with the notion that shareholder coordination affects the speed at 
which information is impounded into stock prices. After controlling other common stock returns 
determinants, such as the market excess return (MKTRF), size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), 
and momentum (UMD), the zero-cost investment portfolio that buys (sells) low coordination 
firms whose corresponding high coordination benchmarks performed best (worst) in the prior 
month has an equally-weighted return of 93 basis points (t=2.69) for RES_COORD_PROX and 
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101 basis points (t=2.59) for RES_COORD_PORT per month, roughly 11.75% and 12.82% per 
year. The corresponding value-weighted returns from the zero-cost investment portfolios are 85 
(99) basis points for RES_COORD_PROX (RES_COORD_PORT), around 10.69% (12.54%) per 
year. 
 Next, we test the information diffusion hypothesis in a more general setting where we use 
test assets more appropriate for testing whether coordination can affect the diffusion of 
market-wide rather than industry-specific, value relevant information. Specifically, at the end of 
June in each year, we sort firms into 125 portfolios (DGTW 125) based on size, book-to-market 
and momentum characteristics (see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997)). We then 
idependently sort firms based on shareholder coordination and identify the portfolio of stocks 
with high shareholder coordination (top coordination tercile) and the matching portfolio of 
otherwise similar stocks with low shareholder coordination (bottom coordination tercile). This 
sorting and matching technique isolates the impact of stock characteristics and allows us to test 
whether market-wide information shocks travel from prices of firms with high shareholder 
coordination to those of firms with low shareholder coordination. We replicate the tests found in 
Table 1.5 using the DGTW 125 portfolios as test assets and report the results in Table 1.6. As we 
can see, there is again strong evidence that shareholder coordination serves as an information 
diffusion channel. Take RES_COORD_PROX, for example: after controlling other common 
factors, the zero-cost investment portfolio that buys (sells) low coordination firms whose 
corresponding high coordination benchmarks performed best (worst) in the prior month delivers 
an equally-weighted return of 66 basis points (t=2.92) per month, about 8.21% per year. The 
corresponding value-weighted return is 111 basis points (t=3.30) per month, about 14.16% per 
year. Finally, RES_COORD_PORT generates quantitatively similar results. 
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 We then test our hypothesis in a cross-sectional framework, using Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. The dependent variable is the stock return for low shareholder coordination firms in 
month t (Rett). The main independent variable is the stock return of the high shareholder 
coordination benchmark in month t-1 (i.e., the return of a “clone” portfolio of otherwise similar 
firms with high coordination, Clone_rett-1). Other independent variables include the low 
shareholder coordination firm’s own return in month t-1 (Rett-1) to control for the short-term 
reversal effect (Jegadeesh (1990)). We also control for firm size (Size), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), Beta, momentum (Ret (-2,-7)), and liquidity (Turnover and CV_Turnover) in the 
regressions. Cross-sectional regressions are run every month and the times-series standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation up to 12 lags (Newey and West (1987)). 
Consistent with the portfolio results, we find that Clone_rett-1 is a strong and significant predictor 
of next month’s stock return of matched low shareholder coordination firms. Take 
RES_COORD_PROX in specification (1) in Table 1.7, for example: the coefficient on 
Clone_rett-1 is 0.0312 with a t-statistics of 3.36, indicating that one standard deviation increase in 
the high coordination benchmark portfolio return in the month t-1 leads to a 31 basis point 
increase in the return of low shareholder coordination firms in month t. In short, both our 
time-series and cross-sectional tests provide strong, consistent evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that good (poor) institutional shareholder coordination facilitates (slows) the diffusion 
of information into market prices.  
 The results from the time series tests in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 and from the cross-sectional 
tests in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 1.7 documented a lead-lag effect in asset prices 
between firms with high and low shareholder coordination. This implies that investors gradually 
update prices of firms lacking coordination based on observation of prices of firms with 
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coordination.  The natural question to ask is how long this information flow process lasts. In 
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 1.7 we test whether stock returns of high shareholder 
coordination benchmarks in deeper lags (e.g. month t-2 and month t-3) also have the ability to 
predict current stock returns of firms with low shareholder coordination. The tests are conducted 
for both industry-level (column (2) and (4)) and market-level information shocks (columns (6) 
and (8)), i.e., using the 125 DGTW and 144 industry-size portfolios as test assets, respectively. 
The results in columns (2) and (4) show that the predictive power of high shareholder 
coordination benchmarks disappear at month t-3, implying that investors update prices of firms 
lacking coordination over a period of approximately two months after the industry-level 
information shock arrives. In comparison, the results in columns (6) and (8) indicate that the 
updating of prices occurs faster in the case of market-level than industry-level information 
shocks in that the coefficients on deeper lagged stock returns of high shareholder coordination 
benchmarks are not significant. This suggests that the speed at which information is digested 
depends on the type of information (market-wide vs industry-specific). 
 To further test whether there exists a lead-lag relation between firms with high 
shareholder coordination and firms with low shareholder coordination, we employ the vector 
autoregression (VAR) model to examine the cross-stock return dynamics based on earlier studies 
in the literature that show significant lead-lag relations among US stock returns (Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990); Chordia and Swaminathan (2000); and Hou (2007)).  
 To construct shareholder coordination portfolios, at the end of June in each year, we first 
sort firms into two portfolios based on whether the average residual shareholder coordination 
over the past four quarters was high (i.e., ranking in the top coordination tercile) or low (i.e., 
ranking in the bottom coordination tercile). We then independently sort firms into 144 portfolios 
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corresponding to the 48 Fama-French industry portfolios, each split into 3 size portfolios (i.e., 
48×3=144). After partitioning firms into double-sorted portfolios, we compute the equally 
weighted monthly returns for each portfolio. We replicate the same sorting procedure for 
DGTW125 portfolios. We estimate the following vector autoregression (VAR) model jointly 
across industry-size 144 or DGTW125 portfolios. 
                          , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1LI t LI t HI t tR a R a R u                              (9)       
, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1HI t LI t HI t tR b R b R v                             (10) 
where RLI,t and RHI,t represent the low and high shareholder coordination portfolio returns at time 
t, respectively. This bivariate VAR system allows us to test whether the lagged returns on the 
high shareholder coordination portfolio in Eq. (9) have any significant power in predicting the 
current returns of the low shareholder coordination portfolio by testing the hypothesis that a2=0. 
In addition, this system allows us to examine whether there is any asymmetry in the 
cross-autocorrelations across the high and low shareholder coordination portfolios by test the 
hypothesis that a2-b1=0.  
       In Panels A and B of Table 1.8, we present the estimation results for industry-size 144 
and DGTW 125 groups, respectively. The results indicate that the lagged returns on the high 
shareholder coordination portfolio predict the current returns on the low shareholder 
coordination portfolio. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of the lagged return on the low 
shareholder coordination in predicting the current return on the high shareholder coordination are 
significantly positive. However, their magnitude is smaller in comparison with that of the lagged 
returns on the high coordination portfolio in predicting current returns on the low coordination 
portfolio. Additionally, the cross-equation tests confirm that the statistical differences between 
the coefficients of the lagged returns on high coordination portfolio in predicting the current 
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returns on the low coordination portfolio and those of the lagged returns on low coordination 
portfolio in predicting the current returns on the high coordination portfolio are positive and 
significant. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a lead-lag relation in stock returns across 
shareholder coordination portfolios.  
 
4.3 Shareholder Coordination and Stock Returns  
      4.3.1 Fama-MacBeth and panel regressions. In this section, we analyze the relation 
between shareholder coordination and future stock returns using Fama-MacBeth regressions. 
Specifically, for each of the 204 months in our sample period, we estimate the following 
regression model: 
                      , , , ,_ _i t i t i t i tR RES COORD X                       (11) 
where Ri,t  is the stock return of firm i in month t. RES_COORD_i,t is one of the shareholder 
coordination measures (RES_COORD_PROX or RES_COORD_PORT) for firm i in month t. At 
the end of June in each year, we take the simple average of the constructed quarterly measure in 
the past four quarters to obtain the annual measures of shareholder coordination. We then use the 
annual measures in June to explain the stock returns of the following 12 months. Xi,t is a vector 
of explanatory variables of cross-sectional expected returns such as beta, size and 
book-to-market ratio.  
 Specifications 1-6 of Table 1.9 report the mean coefficient of the regression, along with 
Newey-West adjusted t statistics. In specifications 1 and 4, the model includes only the 
shareholder coordination measure along with industry and time fixed effects. In the extensive 
specifications, we control for firm size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), systematic risk (Beta), 
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momentum (RET (-2, -7)), liquidity (Turnover and CV_Turnover), institutional ownership (IO) 
and institutional ownership concentration (IO_HHI). Size and BM are constructed as in Fama 
and French (1992). Beta is estimated from the market model over the 36-month window prior to 
the current date. RET (-2, -7) is the compound gross return from month t-7 to month t-2, as in Fu 
(2009). Following Chorida, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), we measure Turnover as the 
average share turnover over the past 36 months and CV_Turnover as the coefficient of variation 
of the past 36 months’ share turnover. IO is the most recent available fraction of outstanding 
shares held by institutional investors. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), IO_HHI is measured 
as the Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages of 
institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. 
 The results in specifications (1) and (4) indicate that shareholder coordination is strongly 
positively related with future stock returns. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
RES_COORD_PROX (RES_COORD_PORT) is associated with an 0.16% (0.25%) increase in 
average monthly returns. On an annualized basis, a one-standard-deviation increase in 
shareholder coordination implies an increase in returns of 1.94% for RES_COORD_PROX and 
3.09% for RES_COORD_PORT. We find consistent results in the models with the extensive 
specifications. In addition, the relations between stock returns and the other controlling variables 
are consistent with prior evidence documented in the literature. For instance, the negative 
relation between Size and average stock return is consistent with the notion that small firms on 
average have higher returns than large firms. BM is positively associated with future stock 
returns, indicating that value firms tend to have higher future returns than growth firms. The 
average slope of Beta is not significantly different from zero. Finally, institutional ownership 
concentration has an adverse impact on firm performance.  
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 To alleviate the concern that the estimation may be biased due to the correlation in 
residuals across years within each firm, we also examine the relation between shareholder 
coordination and stock returns in a panel data regression setting. Petersen (2009) points out that 
in panel analysis, after clustering the standard error by firm, the bias caused by correlated 
residuals due to unobserved firm effects disappears. In specifications 7-12, we repeat the tests 
using models that control for industry and time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by 
firm. We obtain quantitively similar results and confirm that the positive relation between 
shareholder coordination and stock returns is robust.  
4.3.2 Zero cost trading strategies. Do portfolios formed based on shareholder 
coordination yield systematic positive returns, and to what extent can these returns be explained 
by the traditional risk factors? We address these questions by constructing zero-cost investment 
portfolios as follows. At the end of each June, we sort the stocks into quintile (deciles) on the 
basis of corresponding shareholder coordination. The zero-cost portfolios are constructed by 
taking long positions in stocks in the top shareholder coordination quintile (decile) and taking 
short positions in stocks in the bottom shareholder quintile (decile). The portfolios are rebalanced 
at the end of each June. We employ the Fama-French-Carhart four factor model that includes the 
market, size, book-to-market and momentum factors to examine the risk-adjusted return 
performance of portfolios.  
 The results in Table 1.10 are consistent with the notion that firms with high shareholder 
coordination achieve better return performance. For example, in Table 10 Panel D, the average 
abnormal return of the zero-cost investment portfolio that buys top RES_COORD_PORT decile 
firms and sells bottom RES_COORD_PORT firms is 67 basis points per month (t=4.30), or 
roughly 8.34% per year. Given the fact that these portfolios only entail trading every twelve 
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months, they are likely to remain quite profitable even if we allow for sizeable transaction costs. 
It is also worth noting that although the four factor model possesses some power in explaining 
the monthly returns of zero-cost portfolios, it explains at best less than 25% of the variability of 
these returns. Interestingly, the four factor model explains at least 70% of the variability of 
returns of the long portfolio and the short portfolio when considered individually, indicating that 
the zero-cost portfolios average out exposures to the traditional risk factors reasonably well. 
4.3.3 Mechanism. In this section, we explore the mechanism through which shareholder 
coordination forecasts future stock returns. As mentioned in section 2, the evidence on the 
positive relation between corporate governance and future stock returns is sparse. Giroud and 
Mueller (2011) provide indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis that investors do not 
recognize the agency costs caused by weak corporate governance. This hypothesis implies that 
markets are slow to fully incorporate into prices information about the quality of a firm’s 
corporate governance. In other words, the positive relation between quality of corporate 
governance and subsequent returns could be attributed to investors’ gradual incorporation of 
such information spearheaded by sophisticated investor demand for the stock. To test this 
hypothesis we utilize a methodology similar to that of Choi and Sias (2012). Accordingly, the 
gradual incorporation of information explanation in this paper’s context predicts that more 
sophisticated investors (institutional investors) will subsequently buy (sell) stocks of firms with 
high (low) shareholder coordination from less sophisticated investors (retail investors).
14
 
 The annual shareholder coordination is constructed by taking the simple average of the 
quarterly measures in year t. Following Choi and Sias (2012), we use two measures of 
                                                          
14
 Choi and Sias (2012) posit that the gradual incorporation of information explanation predicts that more 
sophisticated investors will subsequently buy (sell) strong (weak) financial strength stocks from less sophisticated 
investors. 
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institutional demand: the adjusted percentage change in the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors and the adjusted percentage change in the number of institutional investors 
of a firm.
15
 The first measure is defined as the difference between the change of institutional 
ownership for stock i in year t and quarter q and the average change of institutional ownership 
for all stocks within the same market capitalization decile d, normalized by the average 
institutional ownership at the end of the last quarter q in year t-1 (q=0) for stocks within the same 
market capitalization decile d:  
             
, , , -1 _ -  i q i q i qinstitutional ownership institutional ownershipC IO            (12) 
                     , ,
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, 0
_ - _
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ADJC IO
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 

 
                       (13) 
 The second measure is defined as the difference between the change of institutional 
breadth for stock i in year t quarter q and the average change of institutional breadth for all 
stocks within the same market capitalization decile d, normalized by the average number of 
institutional shareholders at the end of the last quarter q in year t-1 (q=0) for stocks within the 
same market capitalization decile d:  
         , , , - 1_ #   - #   i q i q i qC I B i n s t i t u t i o n a l s h a r e h o l d e r s i n s t i t u t i o n al s h a r e h o l d e r s        (14) 
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                        (15) 
 To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by statistical outliers, we winsorize the 
above two measures of institutional demand at the 1% and the 99% level. If the positive impact 
of shareholder coordination on future stock returns can be explained, at least partially, by the 
                                                          
15
 Sias (2007) and Choi and Sias (2012) point out that the adjusted change in institutional ownership (breadth) 
overcomes the limitation: the absolute value of the change in institutional ownership (breadth) is correlated with 
firm size and institutional ownership (breadth). 
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gradual information incorporation hypothesis, we should observe a positive relation between 
shareholder coordination and subsequent institutional trading demand. Empirically, we estimate 
the regressions of annual institutional trading demand in year t on shareholder coordination in 
year t-1, and three other variables known to explain the cross-sectional variation in institutional 
trading demand (Chen, Harford and Li (2007)): the natural logarithm of firm size, 
book-to-market ratios, and the natural logarithm of shareholder turnover.  
 Table 1.11 Panel A reports the time-series average coefficients over 17 years estimated 
from Fama-MacBeth regressions with Newey-West adjusted t-statistics. As we can see, the 
coefficients on RES_COORD_PROX in specifications (1) and (5) and the coefficients on 
RES_COORD_PORT in specifications (3) and (7) indicate that high shareholder coordination 
triggers subsequent institutional trading demand, supporting the gradual information 
incorporation hypothesis. In the extended specifications, our results still hold after controlling for 
other relevant variables. The significant and positive coefficients also suggest that our results are 
not driven by institutional trading momentum, because if that were the case, we should not see 
any difference in subsequent institutional trading demand between high shareholder coordination 
and low shareholder coordination firms. To further alleviate the concern that the positive relation 
between shareholder coordination and subsequent institutional trading demand is driven by 
short-term momentum trading and/or aggregate liquidity demand by institutional investors, we 
conduct the tests on a quarterly basis. Each year, we divide firms into quintiles based on the 
shareholder coordination. Then we examine whether the quarterly return differences between top 
and bottom shareholder coordination quintiles are related to the contemporaneous quarterly 
institutional trading demand differences in the subsequent year. The results in Table 1.11 Panel B 
confirm that our results are not driven by the aforementioned alternative explanations.  
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 Theoretical work and empirical evidence suggest that arbitrage costs and information 
uncertainty impede the information incorporation process and cause delayed market reactions to 
certain information.
16
 Therefore, we hypothesize that institutional trading demand becomes 
stronger when arbitrage costs and information uncertainty are higher. We use seven proxies for 
arbitrage limits and information uncertainty: (1) firm size (the market capitalization); (2) 
institutional ownership (the ratio of shares held by institutional investors divided by shares 
outstanding); (3) institutional breadth (the number of institutional investors); (4) shares turnover 
(average monthly share trading volume divided by the average number of shares outstanding 
during a 1-year period ending at the portfolio formation date); (5) analyst coverage (the number 
of analysts following the firm during the most recent fiscal year); (6) idiosyncratic volatility 
(standard deviation of residuals from the regression of excess daily return on 
Fama-French-Carhart four factor model over the quarter q=0); and (7) total return volatility 
(standard deviation of daily return over the quarter q=0). 
 In each year from 1994 to 2010, we independently sort firms into 25 portfolios based on 
combinations of shareholder coordination quintiles and quintiles formed after sorting on each of 
the seven proxies for limits to arbitrage and information uncertainty. We then calculate the 
differences in subsequent institutional trading demand between top and bottom shareholder 
coordination quintiles (SC5-SC1) within each arbitrage costs/information uncertainty quintiles. If 
the positive relation between shareholder coordination and stock returns is driven, at least in part, 
                                                          
16
 For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) establish a model suggesting that arbitrage is constrained by a variety of 
limits. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) provide evidence that when stocks have no close substitutes, arbitrage risk 
is high and mispricing is more likely to be common. Mendenhall (2004) documents that post earnings announcement 
drift, is strongly related to arbitrage risk. Zhang (2006) finds that stocks with greater information uncertainty 
experience greater momentum and price drift. Caskey (2009) provides a theoretical model where the failure of 
information ambiguity-averse investors to incorporate value-relevant information into stock prices contributes to the 
market anomalies.  
 34 
by the gradual incorporation of information, the differences in subsequent institutional trading 
between top and bottom shareholder coordination quintiles should amplify when arbitrage 
costs/information uncertainty are high. Therefore, the differences in highest arbitrage 
costs/information uncertainty quintile (ACIU5) should be significantly larger than the differences 
in lowest arbitrage costs/information uncertainty quintile (ACIU1). 
 The first two rows of each panel in Table 1.12 report the time-series average of the 
seventeen annual cross-sectional means of the high minus low coordination differences in 
subsequent institutional demand for the highest and lowest arbitrage costs/information 
uncertainty portfolios. The last row in each panel of Table 1.12 reports the differences between 
the first two rows. To verify that these differences are statistically meaningful, we estimate the 
following regression model using stocks in the top and bottom of the subsequent institutional 
trading quintiles and top and bottom of arbitrage costs/information uncertainty quintiles.  
       0 1 2 3_  / _  5 5 5 5ADJC IO ADJC IB SC ACIU SC ACIU               (16) 
where SC5 is an indicator variable that is equal to one for the top quintile of shareholder 
coordination and zero for the bottom quintile of shareholder coordination, and ACIU5 is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one for the top quintile of arbitrage costs/information 
uncertainty and zero for the bottom quintile. ADJC_IO and ADJC_IB are measures of 
institutional trading demand for each stock. Thus, the regression coefficient α3 tests whether 
institutional trading differences between firms with high shareholder coordination and firms with 
low shareholder coordination are significantly different between firms with high arbitrage 
costs/information uncertainty and firms with low arbitrage costs/information uncertainty. The 
results in the last row of each panel reveal that in most cases, α3 is significant at the 1% level 
using standard errors adjusted as suggested by Newey and West (1987), supporting our 
 35 
hypothesis that the gradual incorporation of information explains, at least partially, the positive 
relation between shareholder coordination and stock returns.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 Institutional shareholder coordination, i.e. the existence of information sharing networks 
linking institutional investors of a particular firm, has been proven to be an effective mechanism 
that improves corporate governance. In this paper, we focus on the asset prices implications of 
shareholder coordination. We start by showing that local comovement and post-earnings 
announcement drift are weaker in the presence of shareholder coordination, in support of the 
notion that coordination can improve firms’ information environment. We then examine whether 
shareholder coordination serves as an information diffusion channel across firms. Following 
Cohen and Lou (2012), we devise time series and cross-sectional tests that yield strong evidence 
of a lead-lag effect in stock returns between firms with and without coordination, consistent with 
the view that information shocks travel from firms with high shareholder coordination to firms 
with low shareholder coordination.  
 We also document that firms with stronger shareholder coordination are exhibiting better 
stock performance in the future. This finding is consistent with evidence in Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) that firms with better corporate governance have better performance and higher 
firm value. To answer the question why shareholder coordination forecasts stock returns, we 
follow Choi and Sias (2012) and use institutional trading demand as a proxy for the updates in 
institutional investors’ expectations to test whether gradual information incorporation explains, 
at least partially, the positive relation between shareholder coordination and stock returns. Our 
results show that coordination predicts both future returns and subsequent institutional 
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(sophisticated) investor demand, consistent with the argument that investors’ lack of knowledge 
about the true consequences of the quality of corporate governance is the driver of the abnormal 
return performance of high coordination firms.   
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Table 1.1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of main variables in the sample during January 1994 to December 2010. 
COORD_PROX is the inverse of the natural logarithm of 1+ weighted-average geographical distance among 
institutional shareholders of the firm in each firm-quarter, where the weight is the ratio of ownership held by the 
institution to the total ownership held by all institutions in a firm at each calendar quarter. COORD_PORT is the 
weighted-average excess portfolio correlation among institutional shareholders of the firm in each firm-quarter, 
where the weight is the ratio of ownership held by the institution to the total ownership held by all institutions in a 
firm at each calendar quarter, and excess portfolio is the actual weight relative to the weight in market portfolio. 
RES_COORD_PROX is the residual of the quarterly cross-sectional regression of COORD_PROX on a series of 
firm characteristics (see Table 1.2). RES_COORD_PORT is residual of the quarterly cross-sectional regression of 
COORD_PORT on a series of firm characteristics (see Table 1.2).  Size is the natural logarithm of the stock market 
value at the end of each June. BM is the natural logarithm of the fiscal year-end book value of common equity 
divided by the calendar year-end stock market value. Beta is estimated from the market model over 36 months prior 
to the beginning of the current period. IO is the ratio of institutional holdings of a firm to shares outstanding. 
IO_HHI is the Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on percentages of institutional 
holdings by all 13F institutions. Ret (-2, -7) is the compound gross return from month t-7 to t-2. Turnover is the 
average turnover and CV_Turnover is the coefficient of variation of turnovers in the past 36 months. ROA is the 
return on asset measured as the ratio of earnings before extraordinary items. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
plus current debt in liabilities to total asset. Sale_Growth is the annual sale growth in percentage. Firm_age is the 
natural logarithm of firm age defined as the number of years since the firm was included in the Compustat database. 
BHRET12 is the compound gross return in year t-1. City_dummy is equal to 1 if the firm’s headquarter is located in 
one of the major 21 cities or metropolitan areas in the US. The list of major cities is from the US Census Bureau 
population surveys of 1990 and 2000: New York, San Francisco, San Jose, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, 
Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Baltimore, Washington, San Diego, Milwaukee, Detroit, Phoenix, Columbus, 
Indianapolis, Austin, San Antonio, Jacksonville and Memphis. 
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  N Mean Std Median P25 P75 
Shareholder Coordination 
    
COORD_PROX  226,914 -5.9062 1.3666 -6.3611 -6.6687 -5.7397 
COORD_PORT 226,914 0.2900 0.1884 0.2363 0.1551 0.3707 
RES_COORD_PROX  226,914 0.0000 1.0590 -0.0794 -0.5450 0.3420 
RES_COORD_PORT 226,914 0.0000 0.1153 -0.0085 -0.0682 0.0467 
Firm Characteristics  
     
ROA 226,914 -0.0281 0.2270 0.0340 -0.0363 0.0779 
Leverage 226,914 0.1946 0.1879 0.1563 0.0133 0.3205 
Sale_Growth 226,914 0.2638 0.7780 0.1055 -0.0087 0.2858 
Firm_age 226,914 2.5530 0.7815 2.4849 1.9459 3.1781 
BHRET12 226,914 0.1679 0.7468 0.0323 -0.2790 0.3929 
City_dummy 226,914 0.1578 0.3646 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Size 591,041 12.3275 2.0311 12.1951 10.8474 13.6277 
BM 591,041 -0.7338 0.9501 -0.6864 -1.2719 -0.1370 
Beta 591,041 1.2392 0.9193 1.0798 0.6171 1.7077 
IO 591,041 0.4344 0.2834 0.4189 0.1769 0.6770 
IO_HHI 591,041 0.0219 0.0324 0.0162 0.0060 0.0290 
Rett-1 591,041 0.0151 0.2069 0.0000 -0.0805 0.0872 
Ret (-2, -7) 591,041 0.0940 4.4007 0.0142 -0.1994 0.2438 
Turnover 591,041 -2.3425 0.9596 -2.2723 -2.9431 -1.6741 
CV_Turnover 591,041 -0.4732 0.4815 -0.4742 -0.8055 -0.1597 
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Table 1.2 The Determinants of Shareholder Coordination 
 
Table 1.2 Panel A reports the Fama-MacBeth regressions of shareholder coordination. The dependent variable is 
quarterly shareholder coordination (COORD_PROX/COORD_PORT). Control variables are defined in Table i. 
Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar quarter and the time-series standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 4 lags). t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. Panel B presents the correlation matrix of shareholder coordination measures. Panel C shows the results 
of panel regression of shareholder coordination on the degree of synchronization in institutional trading. The latter is 
captured by the standard deviation of the quarterly changes across institutional shareholdings of a particular firm. 
Time and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * indicate a 
two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Fama-MacBeth regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COORD_PROX COORD_PORT 
Size -0.1860*** -0.0468*** 
 
(-16.82) (-36.99) 
BM 0.0067 -0.0065*** 
 
(1.58) (-10.79) 
Beta -0.0545*** -0.0127*** 
 
(-11.43) (-15.42) 
ROA -0.0054 0.0093*** 
 
(-0.29) (4.79) 
Leverage 0.2797*** 0.0252*** 
 
(19.94) (15.27) 
Sale_Growth -0.0171*** 0.0017*** 
 
(-5.51) (3.96) 
Firm_age 0.1120*** -0.0001 
 
(14.49) (-0.14) 
IO -1.8648*** -0.2839*** 
 
(-19.38) (-70.70) 
IO_HHI 5.5756*** 2.7555*** 
 
(24.20) (60.07) 
BHRET12 0.0140** 0.0017** 
 
(2.63) (2.15) 
City_dummy -0.0201*** -0.0020*** 
 
(-5.13) (-4.14) 
Constant -3.2048*** 0.9396*** 
 
(-19.55) (53.19) 
 
  
Observations 226,914 226,914 
R-squared 0.308 0.602 
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Panel B. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. Shareholder Coordination and Synchronization in Institutional trading 
 
  (1) (2) 
RES_COORD_PROX -0.1605*** 
 
 
(-4.92) 
 
RES_COORD_PORT 
 
-0.6368** 
  
(-2.14) 
IO 2.7804*** 2.7785*** 
 
(9.10) (9.09) 
IO_HHI -17.2629*** -17.4511*** 
 
(-6.59) (-6.67) 
Size 1.5777*** 1.5715*** 
 
(37.96) (38.00) 
BM 0.2973*** 0.2968*** 
 
(5.14) (5.13) 
Turnover 8.7972*** 8.7650*** 
 
(21.73) (21.62) 
Ret (-1,-6) 0.0736 0.0739 
 
(1.56) (1.57) 
Constant -15.7157*** -15.6186*** 
 
(-34.95) (-35.01) 
   
Observations 215,653 215,653 
R-squared 0.126 0.126 
 
  
Correlation Matrix (Pearson Correlations Are Shown 
above the Diagonal with Spearman Below) 
  COORD_PROX COORD_PORT RES_COORD_PROX RES_COORD_PORT 
COORD_PROX 1 0.6550 0.7669 0.3499 
COORD_PORT 0.4637 1 0.2802 0.6241 
RES_COORD_PROX 0.4276 -0.1304 1 0.4498 
RES_COORD_PORT -0.0039 0.2693 0.3310 1 
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Table 1.3 Cross-sectional Determinants of Local Comovement 
For each firm in the sample, we estimate time-series regressions of monthly stock returns on the returns of a local 
index and the market portfolio for three periods: 1994–1999, 2000–2004, and 2005–2010. We then regress the 
estimated local beta on firm and regional characteristics. The main independent variable of interest is shareholder 
coordination (RES_COORD_PROX / RES_COORD_PORT). Dividend Yield is the dividend payout divided by the 
market value of equity; MTB is, the market to book ratio. Advertising is the natural logarithm of advertising 
expenditures. Number of Shareholders is the natural logarithm of number of shareholders. Number of Firms is the 
total number of firms in one MSA; Industry HHI is the Herfindahl index calculated based on the percentage of firms 
in one industry for an MSA; Personal Income is the per capita personal income for the MSA; Investment Income is 
the per capita investment income for the MSA. Other control variables are defined in Table1. All independent 
variables are the averages over the three periods. Time fixed effects are also included. t-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
RES_COORD_PROX -0.0404*** -0.0399*** 
  
 
(-3.42) (-3.43) 
  
RES_COORD_PORT 
 
-0.6128*** -0.5823*** 
   
(-5.86) (-5.66) 
Size -0.0965*** -0.1090*** -0.0981*** -0.1105*** 
 
(-11.62) (-13.31) (-11.83) (-13.49) 
MB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) 
Dividend yield -0.0767 -0.0598 -0.0760 -0.0592 
 
(-1.10) (-0.87) (-1.09) (-0.86) 
Leverage -0.0969** -0.0055 -0.0927** -0.0022 
 
(-2.09) (-0.12) (-2.00) (-0.05) 
ROA -0.3918*** -0.3463*** -0.3914*** -0.3464*** 
 
(-15.40) (-13.70) (-15.40) (-13.71) 
Advertising 0.0008 0.0021 0.0009 0.0022 
 
(0.57) (1.52) (0.62) (1.57) 
Number of shareholders -0.0023 0.0076 -0.0017 0.0081 
 
(-0.36) (1.18) (-0.26) (1.26) 
IO -0.0295 -0.0077 -0.0326 -0.0112 
 
(-0.54) (-0.14) (-0.60) (-0.21) 
Industry HHI 
 
-0.3836*** 
 
-0.3820*** 
  
(-10.06) 
 
(-10.03) 
Number of firms 
 
0.0014*** 
 
0.0014*** 
  
(11.41) 
 
(11.43) 
Investment income 
 
-0.1241 
 
-0.1225 
  
(-1.35) 
 
(-1.34) 
Personal income 
 
0.1073 
 
0.1064 
  
(1.41) 
 
(1.40) 
Constant 2.5586*** 2.6980*** 2.5873*** 2.7202*** 
 
(19.42) (20.04) (19.64) (20.21) 
     
Observations 12,646 12,646 12,646 12,646 
R-squared 0.366 0.397 0.368 0.399 
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Table 1.4 Shareholder Coordination and Post-Earnings Announcement Drift 
 
For each quarter from 1994 to 2010, we sort firms into quintiles based on corresponding earnings surprises proxied 
by analyst forecast error. ES1 (bad news) and ES5 (good news) refer to the extreme earnings surprises (bottom and 
top), respectively. For each earnings surprise quintile in each quarter, we further sort firms into five portfolios based 
on shareholder coordination. Then we calculate the average buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal return over the 
window [2, 61] relative to announcement date for each quintile. The buy-and-hold cumulative abnormal returns are 
defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the announcing firm and that of a size and 
book-to-market (B/M) matching portfolio. t-Statistics adjusted for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses 
below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
RES_COORD_PROX 
 
RES_COORD_PROT 
 
ES1 ES5 ES5-ES1 
 
ES1 ES5 ES5-ES1 
Low -0.0183 0.0357 0.0540*** 
 
-0.0208 0.0352 0.0560*** 
   
(10.11) 
   
(10.54) 
2 -0.0139 0.0296 0.0436*** 
 
-0.0113 0.0290 0.0403*** 
   
(8.86) 
   
(8.21) 
3 -0.0026 0.0281 0.0307*** 
 
-0.0089 0.0248 0.0337*** 
   
(6.49) 
   
(7.14) 
4 -0.0079 0.0229 0.0308*** 
 
-0.0057 0.0250 0.0306*** 
   
(6.67) 
   
(6.63) 
High -0.0078 0.0215 0.0294*** 
 
-0.0042 0.0240 0.0281*** 
   
(6.35) 
   
(5.99) 
High-Low 0.0105*** -0.0141*** -0.0247*** 
 
0.0167*** -0.0112** -0.0279*** 
 
(2.15) (-2.78) (-3.49) 
 
(3.41) (-2.19) (-3.93) 
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Table 1.5 Stock Return Predictability Time-Series Test: FF48×3Size=144 Portfolios 
 
At the end of June in each year from 1994 to 2010, we first sort firms into 3 size portfolios within each Fama-French 
48 industries. The firms are independently sorted into 3 portfolios based on the simple average of shareholder 
coordination over the past 4 quarters. We then construct the clone firm for each low shareholder coordination firm 
(firms in bottom tercile) with the portfolio of firms with high shareholder coordination (stocks in top tercile) in the 
same industry-size portfolio. At the beginning of every calendar month, all low shareholder coordination firms are 
ranked into quintiles in an ascending order on the basis of stock returns of their corresponding clone firms in the 
previous month. All stocks are equally (value) weighted within a given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced 
every calendar month. Panel A and B report the results for RES_COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PORT, 
respectively. The explanatory variables are MKTRF (the value-weighted market return in excess of one month 
Treasury bill rate, SMB (the difference each month between the return on small and big firms), HML (the monthly 
difference of the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms), and UMD (the 
momentum factor computed on a monthly basis as the return difference between a portfolio of winners and a 
portfolio of losers). High/Low is the zero-cost investment portfolio of low shareholder coordination firms that longs 
the clone ﬁrms with the top quintile returns and shorts the clone ﬁrms with the bottom quintile returns in the 
previous month. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a 
two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. RES_COORD_PROX 
 
Panel A1. Equal weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low -0.0004 1.0756*** 0.8917*** 0.1191 -0.3361*** 0.799 
 
(-0.13) (17.59) (11.63) (1.45) (-6.84) 
 
2 0.0056** 0.9131*** 0.9080*** -0.0572 -0.3965*** 0.820 
 
(2.33) (16.67) (13.22) (-0.78) (-9.01) 
 
3 0.0074*** 1.0072*** 0.9452*** 0.0252 -0.2608*** 0.859 
 
(3.55) (21.09) (15.79) (0.39) (-6.79) 
 
4 0.0086*** 1.0208*** 1.0574*** 0.0477 -0.2443*** 0.878 
 
(4.31) (22.36) (18.48) (0.78) (-6.66) 
 
High 0.0090*** 0.9385*** 1.1774*** 0.0812 -0.1694*** 0.823 
 
(3.72) (16.96) (16.97) (1.09) (-3.81) 
 
High-Low 0.0093*** -0.1371* 0.2857*** -0.0379 0.1667*** 0.113 
  (2.69) (-1.72) (2.86) (-0.36) (2.60)   
Panel A2. Value weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low -0.0035 1.0860*** 0.5116*** -0.0175 -0.2087*** 0.784 
 
(-1.34) (18.43) (6.83) (-0.22) (-4.37) 
 
2 -0.0016 0.9797*** 0.4438*** -0.1283* -0.1984*** 0.773 
 
(-0.67) (17.49) (6.23) (-1.72) (-4.37) 
 
3 0.0034 0.8830*** 0.7074*** 0.0495 -0.1069** 0.750 
 
(1.35) (15.56) (9.81) (0.65) (-2.33) 
 
4 0.0037* 1.0169*** 0.6297*** -0.1369** -0.0610 0.825 
 
(1.68) (20.40) (9.94) (-2.06) (-1.51) 
 
High 0.0051** 0.9628*** 0.7020*** -0.1215* -0.1033** 0.822 
 
(2.32) (19.22) (11.02) (-1.82) (-2.55) 
 
High-Low 0.0085** -0.1203 0.1891** -0.1009 0.1044* 0.074 
  (2.57) (-1.61) (1.99) (-1.01) (1.72)   
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Panel B. RES_COORD_PORT 
 
 
Panel B1. Equal weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0014 1.0289*** 1.0198*** 0.1298 -0.3912*** 0.784 
 
(0.49) (15.58) (12.32) (1.47) (-7.37) 
 
2 0.0031 1.0448*** 0.8633*** 0.0001 -0.3067*** 0.846 
 
(1.38) (20.46) (13.49) (0.00) (-7.47) 
 
3 0.0041* 1.0081*** 0.8881*** -0.0370 -0.2684*** 0.856 
 
(1.97) (20.99) (14.75) (-0.57) (-6.95) 
 
4 0.0065*** 0.9625*** 1.0736*** 0.1189* -0.2679*** 0.865 
 
(3.19) (20.49) (18.23) (1.89) (-7.10) 
 
High 0.0115*** 0.9422*** 1.2155*** 0.0807 -0.2073*** 0.826 
 
(4.69) (16.78) (17.27) (1.07) (-4.60) 
 
High-Low 0.0101** -0.0866 0.1957* -0.0491 0.1839** 0.074 
  (2.59) (-0.97) (1.75) (-0.41) (2.56)   
Panel B2. Value weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0008 0.8953*** 0.7575*** -0.0328 -0.5398*** 0.746 
 
(0.26) (12.39) (8.25) (-0.34) (-9.23) 
 
2 0.0012 1.1013*** 0.6972*** -0.2768*** -0.0036 0.849 
 
(0.52) (21.80) (10.86) (-4.11) (-0.09) 
 
3 0.0019 1.0363*** 0.5299*** -0.2971*** -0.2873*** 0.800 
 
(0.72) (17.49) (7.04) (-3.76) (-5.99) 
 
4 0.0067*** 0.8604*** 0.8893*** -0.2610*** -0.0696 0.799 
 
(2.74) (15.43) (12.55) (-3.51) (-1.54) 
 
High 0.0107*** 0.9109*** 0.9937*** -0.0994 -0.0115 0.724 
 
(3.47) (12.96) (11.13) (-1.06) (-0.20) 
 
High-Low 0.0099* 0.0156 0.2362 -0.0667 0.5284*** 0.190 
  (1.94) (0.13) (1.60) (-0.43) (5.62)   
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Table 1.6 Stock Return Predictability Time-Series Test: DGTW 125 Portfolios 
  
At the end of June in each year from 1994 to 2010, we independently sort firms into the DGTW 125 portfolios and 3 
portfolios based on the simple average of shareholder coordination over the past four quarters. We then construct the 
clone firm for each low shareholder coordination firm (firms in bottom tercile) with the portfolio of high shareholder 
coordination firms (stocks in top tercile) within the same DGTW 125 portfolios. At the beginning of every calendar 
month, all low shareholder coordination firms are ranked into quintiles in an ascending order on the basis of stock 
returns of their corresponding clone firms in the previous month. All stocks are equally (value) weighted within a 
given portfolio, and the portfolios are rebalanced every calendar month. Panel A and B report the results for 
RES_COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PORT, respectively. The explanatory variables are MKTRF (the 
value-weighted market return in excess of one month Treasury bill rate, SMB (the difference each month between 
the return on small and big firms), HML (the monthly difference if the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market 
and low book-to-market firms), and UMD (the momentum factor computed on a monthly basis as the return 
difference between a portfolio of winners and a portfolio of losers). High/Low is the zero-cost investment portfolio 
of firms with low coordination that longs the clone ﬁrms with the top quintile returns and shorts the clone ﬁrms with 
the bottom quintile returns in the previous month. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. 
***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. RES_COORD_PROX 
 
Panel A. Equal weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0024 1.0056*** 0.9235*** 0.0218 -0.3030*** 0.849 
 
(1.12) (19.71) (14.49) (0.32) (-7.60) 
 
2 0.0055** 0.9342*** 1.0212*** 0.0130 -0.2897*** 0.849 
 
(2.55) (18.50) (16.20) (0.19) (-7.34) 
 
3 0.0070*** 0.9689*** 0.9645*** 0.0834 -0.2243*** 0.846 
 
(3.31) (19.61) (15.63) (1.25) (-5.81) 
 
4 0.0054*** 1.0043*** 0.9812*** 0.2357*** -0.2392*** 0.883 
 
(2.97) (23.58) (18.45) (4.11) (-7.18) 
 
High 0.0090*** 1.0169*** 0.9745*** 0.1816*** -0.3169*** 0.888 
 
(4.85) (23.51) (18.04) (3.12) (-9.37) 
 
High-Low 0.0066*** 0.0113 0.0510 0.1597** -0.0139 0.031 
  (2.92) (0.22) (0.78) (2.27) (-0.34)   
Panel A2. Value weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low -0.0016 1.0980*** 0.4556*** -0.0449 -0.3180*** 0.769 
 
(-0.61) (17.54) (5.83) (-0.53) (-6.50) 
 
2 -0.0000 1.1094*** 0.7980*** 0.2490*** -0.2344*** 0.800 
 
(-0.01) (18.89) (10.88) (3.15) (-5.11) 
 
3 0.0007 0.9552*** 0.7050*** -0.0756 -0.1154*** 0.785 
 
(0.30) (17.58) (10.39) (-1.03) (-2.72) 
 
4 0.0023 0.8569*** 0.6609*** -0.2076*** -0.2835*** 0.825 
 
(1.11) (17.84) (11.02) (-3.21) (-7.55) 
 
High 0.0095*** 0.9011*** 0.5688*** 0.0822 -0.2576*** 0.816 
 
(4.79) (19.51) (9.86) (1.32) (-7.14) 
 
High-Low 0.0111*** -0.1969** 0.1132 0.1271 0.0604 0.068 
  (3.30) (-2.51) (1.15) (1.20) (0.98)   
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Panel B. RES_COORD_PORT 
 
Panel B1. Equal weights 
 
Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0028 0.9798*** 0.8863*** -0.0147 -0.3186*** 0.799 
 
(1.15) (17.06) (12.23) (-0.19) (-7.06) 
 
2 0.0041** 1.0017*** 0.9748*** 0.0211 -0.2893*** 0.870 
 
(2.13) (22.03) (16.99) (0.34) (-8.10) 
 
3 0.0058*** 0.9786*** 1.1001*** 0.1855*** -0.2355*** 0.842 
 
(2.74) (19.45) (17.33) (2.71) (-5.96) 
 
4 0.0058*** 0.9493*** 1.0757*** 0.1880*** -0.3005*** 0.876 
 
(3.18) (21.82) (19.60) (3.18) (-8.80) 
 
High 0.0078*** 0.9829*** 0.9992*** 0.2398*** -0.3132*** 0.877 
 
(4.28) (22.87) (18.43) (4.10) (-9.28) 
 
High-Low 0.0050** 0.0031 0.1129* 0.2545*** 0.0054 0.063 
  (2.18) (0.06) (1.66) (3.47) (0.13)   
Panel B2. Value weights 
  Constant MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low -0.0024 0.8868*** 0.4771*** -0.1018 -0.1943*** 0.714 
 
(-0.99) (15.49) (6.61) (-1.31) (-4.32) 
 
2 -0.0024 0.8789*** 0.6027*** -0.2286*** -0.2071*** 0.774 
 
(-1.09) (16.70) (9.08) (-3.19) (-5.01) 
 
3 -0.0002 0.8916*** 0.7353*** -0.1081 -0.2354*** 0.757 
 
(-0.09) (15.55) (10.16) (-1.39) (-5.22) 
 
4 0.0014 0.8049*** 0.7612*** -0.0783 -0.2676*** 0.825 
 
(0.75) (18.27) (13.69) (-1.31) (-7.73) 
 
High 0.0067*** 0.8640*** 0.6638*** 0.1032 -0.3020*** 0.792 
 
(3.22) (17.62) (10.73) (1.55) (-7.84) 
 
High-Low 0.0091*** -0.0228 0.1867** 0.2050** -0.1077* 0.054 
  (2.99) (-0.32) (2.06) (2.10) (-1.91) 
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Table 1.7 Stock Return Predictability Cross-Sectional Test: Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth forecasting regressions of stock returns. The dependent variable is the monthly 
stock return of the firms with low shareholder coordination. In columns (1) and (3), the main independent variable is 
the lagged monthly return of corresponding clone firms (Clone_ret) constructed using the portfolio of firms with 
high coordination in the same industry-size portfolio at the end of each June. In columns (2) and (4), we further 
include the monthly return of corresponding clone firms at deeper lags (e.g. month t-2 and month t-3). In columns (5) 
and (7), the main independent variable is the lagged monthly return of corresponding clone firms (Clone_ret) 
constructed using the portfolio of firms with high coordination in the same DGTW 125 portfolio at the end of each 
June. In columns (6) and (8), we further include the monthly return of corresponding clone firms at deeper lags (e.g. 
month t-2 and month t-3). Refer to Table 1 for detailed variable definitions. Cross-sectional regressions are run 
every calendar month and the time-series standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up 
to 12 lags). t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed 
test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  FF48 3SIZE   DGTW 125 
  RES_COORD_PROX RES_COORD_PORT   RES_COORD_PROX RES_COORD_PORT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Clone_rett-1 0.0312*** 0.0308*** 0.0329*** 0.0288*** 
 
0.0223*** 0.0246*** 0.0155** 0.0159* 
 
(3.36) (3.45) (3.75) (3.25) 
 
(2.63) (2.82) (1.98) (1.76) 
Clone_rett-2 0.0191** 
 
0.0174* 
  
-0.0053 
 
0.0048 
  
(2.39) 
 
(1.88) 
  
(-0.55) 
 
(0.53) 
Clone_rett-3 0.0017  
0.0104 
  
-0.0051 
 
-0.0096 
  
(0.23) 
 
(1.33) 
  
(-0.49) 
 
(-1.11) 
Size -0.0035*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0033*** 
 
-0.0039*** -0.0042*** -0.0061*** -0.0031*** 
 
(-3.60) (-3.41) (-3.15) (-2.95) 
 
(-3.73) (-3.43) (-5.32) (-3.02) 
BM 0.0009 0.0010 0.0006 0.0007 
 
0.0005 0.0013 0.0005 0.0017* 
 
(0.92) (1.04) (0.66) (0.70) 
 
(0.54) (1.08) (0.44) (1.66) 
Beta 0.0024 0.0023 0.0011 0.0012 
 
0.0035** 0.0041** 0.0029 0.0010 
 
(1.36) (1.31) (0.62) (0.65) 
 
(2.05) (2.01) (1.65) (0.64) 
Ret (-2, -7) 0.0064 0.0062 0.0057 0.0053 
 
0.0082** 0.0069 0.0075** 0.0092*** 
 
(1.47) (1.43) (1.33) (1.22) 
 
(2.03) (1.44) (2.14) (2.89) 
Rett-1 -0.0555*** -0.0548*** -0.0528*** -0.0520*** 
 
-0.0510*** -0.0502*** -0.0435*** -0.0407*** 
 
(-8.31) (-8.19) (-8.50) (-8.35) 
 
(-7.22) (-6.25) (-7.34) (-8.16) 
Turnover 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 
 
0.0005 0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0017 
 
(0.12) (0.04) (0.04) (-0.13) 
 
(0.35) (0.54) (-1.03) (-1.17) 
CV_Turnover -0.0066*** -0.0067*** -0.0062*** -0.0061*** 
 
-0.0064*** -0.0068*** -0.0079*** -0.0093*** 
 
(-3.83) (-3.87) (-4.09) (-4.00) 
 
(-3.83) (-3.75) (-4.50) (-5.54) 
Constant 0.0486*** 0.0461*** 0.0469*** 0.0453*** 
 
0.0547*** 0.0614*** 0.0748*** 0.0432*** 
 
(3.30) (3.09) (2.94) (2.78) 
 
(3.43) (3.35) (4.44) (2.85) 
          
Observations 205,520 203,142 205,520 203,142 
 
195,755 168,248 195,755 168,248 
Adj. R-squared 0.049 0.049 0.047 0.047   0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 
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Table 1.8 Vector-Auto Regressions Test of Intra-Portfolio Lead-Lag Effect 
 
This table presents the estimation results of vector autoregression (VAR) model using equal-weighted monthly 
returns on the industry&size144-coordination and DGTW125-coordination portfolios. At the end of each June, 
stocks are sorted into terciles according to the average shareholder coordination over past four quarters. In addition, 
stocks are independently sorted into three size groups within each of 48 industries based on their latest available 
market capitalization or DGTW 125 portfolios, respectively. Then, equal-weighted returns of low coordination 
portfolio (and high coordination portfolio are computed within each industry-size or DGTW125 group, respectively. 
Finally, the following VAR is estimated jointly across all industry&size144 or DGTW125 group. 
    
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1
, 1 1 , 1 2 , 1
LI t LI t HI t t
HI t LI t HI t t
R a R a R u
R b R b R v


 
 
   
   
 
 
where RLI,,t and RHI,t are the month t return on the low and high coordination portfolio, respectively. Panel A and B 
report the VAR estimation for low and high coordination portfolio returns controlling for industry-size and DGTW 
firm characteristics, respectively. The F-values are reported for the cross-equation test of null hypotheses: a2-b1=0, 
and for the within-equation test of null hypotheses: a2-a1=0 and b2-b1=0, respectively. The t-values are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  
  
Independent Variables Cross-equation test Within-equation test 
Groups Dependent Variables RLI,,t-1 RHI,t-1 a2-b1=0 a2-a1=0 b2-b1=0 
Industry-size144 Panel A1: RES_COORD_PROX 
 
RLI,,t 0.0443*** 0.1627*** 77.84*** 39.86*** 20.23*** 
  
(3.27) (8.71) 
   
 
RHI,t 0.0186*** 0.0508***    
  
(5.18) (6.51) 
   
Industry-size144 Panel A2: RES_COORD_PORT 
 
RLI,,t 0.0413*** 0.1676*** 69.92*** 42.73*** 13.36*** 
  
(3.38) (8.96) 
   
 
RHI,t 0.0275*** 0.0553***    
  
(7.25) (6.99) 
   
DGTW 125 Panel B1: RES_COORD_PROX 
 
RLI,,t 0.0467*** 0.1592*** 75.78*** 38.31*** 15.40*** 
  
(3.44) (7.88) 
   
 
RHI,t 0.0190*** 0.0469***    
  
(4.44) (5.34) 
   
DGTW 125 Panel B2: RES_COORD_PORT 
 
RLI,,t 0.0815*** 0.1181*** 69.92*** 5.92** 4.05** 
  
(5.95) (6.07) 
   
 
RHI,t 0.0276*** 0.0410***    
  
(6.42) (4.61) 
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Table 1.9 Shareholder Coordination and Stock Returns: Regression Analysis 
 
This table reports the estimate of Fama-MacBeth and panel regression analysis relating shareholder coordination to stock returns. The sample period is from 
January 1994 to December 2010. The dependent variable is monthly stock return. The main independent variables are shareholder coordination 
(RES_COORD_PROX and RES_COORD_PORT). Other control variables are defined in Table1. Specifications 1-6 report the results for monthly Fama-MacBeth 
regressions with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 12 lags). Specifications 7-12 report the results for panel regressions 
with time and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * 
indicate a two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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  Fama-Macbeth Regressions  Panel Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
RES_COORD_PROX 0.0012** 0.0010** 0.0011** 
   
0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 
   
 
(2.44) (2.16) (2.34) 
   
(4.76) (4.25) (3.88) 
   
RES_COORD_PORT 
   
0.0135*** 0.0112** 0.0110** 
   
0.0136*** 0.0116*** 0.0111*** 
    
(2.95) (2.46) (2.56) 
   
(5.11) (4.31) (4.07) 
Size  
 
-0.0017** -0.0025*** 
 
-0.0017** -0.0026*** 
 
-0.0020*** -0.0033*** 
 
-0.0020*** -0.0033*** 
  
(-2.12) (-4.17) 
 
(-2.13) (-4.24) 
 
(-15.06) (-15.00) 
 
(-15.11) (-15.09) 
BM 
 
0.0037*** 0.0024*** 
 
0.0037*** 0.0024*** 
 
0.0047*** 0.0041*** 
 
0.0047*** 0.0041*** 
  
(2.90) (2.66) 
 
(2.87) (2.61) 
 
(12.94) (10.75) 
 
(12.89) (10.72) 
Beta 
  
0.0012 
  
0.0012 
  
0.0007** 
  
0.0007** 
   
(0.88) 
  
(0.85) 
  
(2.10) 
  
(2.03) 
Ret (-2, -7) 
  
0.0017 
  
0.0018 
  
-0.0001 
  
-0.0001 
   
(0.53) 
  
(0.54) 
  
(-1.27) 
  
(-1.26) 
Turnover 
  
-0.0016 
  
-0.0015 
  
-0.0009** 
  
-0.0008** 
   
(-1.16) 
  
(-1.09) 
  
(-2.57) 
  
(-2.35) 
CV_Turnover 
  
-0.0049*** 
  
-0.0051*** 
  
-0.0079*** 
  
-0.0080*** 
   
(-4.12) 
  
(-4.27) 
  
(-10.25) 
  
(-10.42) 
IO 
  
0.0034 
  
0.0031 
  
0.0006 
  
0.0004 
   
(0.75) 
  
(0.69) 
  
(0.38) 
  
(0.23) 
IO_HHI 
  
-0.0415*** 
  
-0.0406*** 
  
-0.0264*** 
  
-0.0254*** 
   
(-3.19) 
  
(-3.14) 
  
(-2.83) 
  
(-2.81) 
Constant 0.0126*** 0.0340*** 0.0338*** 0.0126*** 0.0340*** 0.0345*** 0.0105*** 0.0381*** 0.0464*** 0.0104*** 0.0381*** 0.0467*** 
 
(2.74) (2.90) (2.77) (2.73) (2.90) (2.84) (15.85) (20.98) (16.59) (15.68) (20.99) (16.67) 
             
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
TIME FE NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 591,041 
Adj. R-squared 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.026 0.04 0.062 0.027 0.04 0.062 
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Table 1.10 Zero-Cost Investment Portfolio based on Shareholder Coordination 
This table reports the results of the performance of zero-cost investment portfolios based on the shareholder 
coordination. At the end of each year from 1994 to 2010, we sort firms into quintiles (deciles) based on shareholder 
coordination. Zero-cost portfolios are then formed by taking long positions in firms with highest shareholder 
coordination (high) and taking short positions in firms with lowest shareholder coordination (low). Portfolios are 
rebalanced annually. The explanatory variables are MKTRF (the value-weighted market return in excess of one 
month Treasury bill rate, SMB (the difference each month between the return on small and big firms), HML (the 
monthly difference if the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms), and UMD 
(the momentum factor computed on a monthly basis as the return difference between a portfolio of winners and a 
portfolio of losers). t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a 
two-tailed test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: RES_COORD_PROX (Quintiles) 
 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0055*** 0.9764*** 0.9832*** 0.0519 -0.2879*** 0.870 
 (2.82) (22.17) (17.38) (0.86) (-7.96)  
High 0.0076*** 0.9554*** 0.7506*** -0.0176 -0.2709*** 0.856 
 
(4.05) (22.37) (13.68) (-0.30) (-7.73) 
 
High-Low 0.0021** -0.021 -0.2326*** -0.0695** 0.017 0.243 
 
(2.09) (-0.90) (-7.80) (-2.19) (0.89) 
 
Panel B:  RES_COORD_PROX (Deciles) 
 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0077*** 0.9437*** 0.9939*** 0.0266 -0.2704*** 0.806 
 (3.18) (17.22) (14.12) (0.36) (-6.01)  
High 0.0116*** 0.8609*** 0.8867*** -0.0985 -0.2780*** 0.708 
 
(3.93) (12.85) (10.30) (-1.08) (-5.05) 
 
High-Low 0.0039** -0.0828** -0.1072** -0.1251*** -0.0075 0.058 
 
(2.58) (-2.39) (-2.41) (-2.64) (-0.26) 
 
Panel C: RES_COORD_PORT (Quintiles) 
 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0042** 0.9928*** 0.9787*** 0.0518 -0.2839*** 0.891 
 
(2.35) (24.72) (18.97) (0.95) (-8.61) 
 
High 0.0074*** 0.9430*** 0.7671*** -0.0266 -0.2757*** 0.85 
 
(3.87) (21.59) (13.67) (-0.45) (-7.69) 
 
High-Low 0.0033*** -0.0498** -0.2116*** -0.0784** 0.0083 0.249 
 
(3.36) (-2.24) (-7.39) (-2.58) (0.45) 
 
Panel D: RES_COORD_PORT (Deciles) 
 
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD R-squared 
Low 0.0042* 1.0044*** 1.0311*** -0.0226 -0.2932 0.853 
 
(1.92) (20.29) (16.22) (-0.33) (-7.21) 
 
High 0.0109*** 0.8720*** 0.9020*** -0.0666 -0.2484*** 0.723 
 
(3.83) (13.54) (10.91) (-0.76) (-4.70) 
 
High-Low 0.0067*** -0.1324*** -0.1290*** -0.044 0.0447 0.140 
 
(4.30) (-3.76) (-2.85) (-0.91) (1.54) 
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Table 1.11 Predicting Institutional Demand 
 
Table 1.11 Panel A presents the time-series average coefficients and associated t-statistics for seventeen annual regressions of subsequent institutional trading 
demand in year t on shareholder coordination in year t-1. Panel B reports results from regression of the quarterly market-adjusted return difference 
(cross-sectional average quarterly market-adjusted return for high shareholder coordination firms less the average quarterly market-adjusted return for low 
shareholder coordination firms) on the quarterly institutional trading demand difference (cross-sectional average institutional trading demand for high 
shareholder coordination firms less the average institutional trading demand for low shareholder coordination firms). The institutional demand metrics and other 
control variable are defined in Table 1. Cross-sectional regressions are run every calendar year and the time-series standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (up to 4 lags). t-Statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A.  Determinants of institutional trading demand 
 
  ADJC_IOt  ADJC_IBt   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
RES_COORD_PROX-1 0.0133*** 0.0126*** 0.0180*** 0.0156***     
 
(4.06) (3.52) (4.70) (4.06) 
    
RES_COORD_PORTt-1     
0.1174*** 0.1032*** 0.2856*** 0.2554*** 
     
(3.92) (3.29) (9.91) (8.29) 
Sizet-1  
-0.0161*** 
 
-0.0366*** 
 
-0.0162*** 
 
-0.0365*** 
  
(-6.60) 
 
(-9.79) 
 
(-6.60) 
 
(-9.74) 
BMt-1  
-0.0126** 
 
-0.0158*** 
 
-0.0125** 
 
-0.0156*** 
  
(-2.36) 
 
(-3.96) 
 
(-2.37) 
 
(-3.92) 
Rett  
0.0968*** 
 
0.2024*** 
 
0.0968*** 
 
0.2021*** 
  
(10.21) 
 
(8.46) 
 
(10.15) 
 
(8.47) 
Rett-1  
0.0346*** 
 
0.0418*** 
 
0.0349*** 
 
0.0430*** 
  
(5.93) 
 
(6.93) 
 
(5.98) 
 
(7.08) 
Turnovert  
-0.0527* 
 
0.1715*** 
 
-0.0517 
 
0.1714*** 
  
(-1.76) 
 
(3.68) 
 
(-1.73) 
 
(3.66) 
Turnovert-1  
-0.0718*** 
 
-0.2562*** 
 
-0.0712*** 
 
-0.2526*** 
  
(-3.55) 
 
(-5.80) 
 
(-3.60) 
 
(-5.79) 
Constant -0.0029 0.1941*** 0.0434*** 0.4746*** -0.0030 0.1948*** 0.0432*** 0.4726*** 
 
(-0.58) (5.02) (7.70) (8.26) (-0.60) (5.01) (7.68) (8.22) 
Observations 53,159 53,159 53,159 53,159 53,159 53,159 53,159 53,159 
R-squared 0.003 0.064 0.002 0.063 0.004 0.196 0.009 0.200 
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Panel B. Regression of quarterly return difference (high shareholder coordination firms less low shareholder 
coordination firms) on quarterly institutional trading demand difference 
 
 
RES_COORD_PROXq RES_COORD_PORTq 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADJC_IOq 0.4607**   
0.1864 
  
 
(2.55) 
  
(0.76) 
  
ADJC_IOq 0.3728**   
0.6592** 
   
(2.00) 
  
(2.07) 
Constant 0.0005 0.0013 0.0007 -0.016 
 
(0.15) (0.43) (0.11) (-1.52) 
R-squared 0.095 0.061 0.009 0.065 
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Table 1.12 Institutional Demand Difference between Firms with Low and High 
Coordination for High and Low Limits to Arbitrage/Information Uncertainty Portfolios 
In each year from 1994 to 2010, we independently sort the firms into 5×5 groups based on the annual shareholder 
coordination (RES_COORD_PROX / RES_COORD_PORT) and each of seven proxies for limits to arbitrage / 
information uncertainty. We then calculate the differences in subsequent institutional trading demand between top 
and bottom shareholder coordination quintiles (SC5-SC1) within each arbitrage costs/information uncertainty 
quintile. The first two rows in each panel report the time-series average of the seventeen cross-sectional means for 
the stocks in the highest and lowest limits to arbitrage / information uncertainty portfolios. The third row in each 
panel reports the difference between the first two rows and associated t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed 
test significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  RES_COORD_PROX RES_COORD_PORT 
Arbitrage limits / Information 
uncertainty (AL / IU) 
ADJC_IO  ADJC_IB  ADJC_IO  ADJC_IB  
 
Panel A: Market capitalization  
Small firms  8.034% 7.777% 3.753% 9.339% 
Large firms  -5.545% -0.406% -2.393% -0.824% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 13.579% 8.183% 6.146% 10.163% 
  (7.38)*** (4.35)*** (3.16)*** (5.15)*** 
 
Panel B: Number of Institutional shareholders 
Small IO breadth 5.388% 3.948% 0.875% 4.709% 
Large IO breadth -4.508% 0.846% 1.190% -0.121% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 9.896% 3.102% -0.315% 4.830% 
  (4.52)*** (1.38) (0.14) (2.04)** 
 
Panel C: Institutional ownership 
Low IO ownership 7.684% 8.083% 3.277% 11.153% 
High IO ownership 5.393% -2.257% 8.180% -4.516% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 2.291% 10.340% -4.903% 15.669% 
  (1.40) (4.06)*** (-3.58)*** (9.73)*** 
 
Panel D: Liquidity 
Low turnover 7.684% 8.083% 4.957% 9.420% 
High turnover -4.520% -2.845% -2.081% 2.306% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 12.204% 10.929% 7.038% 7.114% 
  (9.68)*** (8.04)*** (5.59)*** (5.25)*** 
 
Panel E: Analyst coverage 
Few analyst  3.752% 3.747% 4.689% 13.122% 
Many analyst -7.686% -4.408% -4.703% -6.782% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 11.438% 8.155% 9.392% 19.904% 
  (5.94)*** (3.75)*** (4.93)*** (9.14)*** 
 
Panel F: Idiosyncratic volatility 
High volatility 8.317% 9.297% 5.319% 13.635% 
Low volatility -3.088% -4.640% -0.357% -4.191% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 11.404% 13.937% 5.676% 17.826% 
  (8.35)*** (9.23)*** (4.21)*** (12.09)*** 
 
Panel G: Total return volatility 
High volatility 4.441% 6.796% 3.274% 13.124% 
Low volatility -0.455% -3.776% -0.426% -1.920% 
High-Low (AL/IU) 4.896% 10.572% 3.701% 15.045% 
  (3.89)*** (7.36)*** (2.98)*** (10.72)*** 
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Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 Although the importance of institutional shareholders for corporate governance (e.g., 
Gillan and Starks (2000); Chen, Harford and Li (2007)) and informational efficiency (e.g., 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Boehmer and Kelley (2009)) has been emphasized by the 
findings of numerous studies in the past, the role of information sharing networks linking 
institutional investors has gone largely unnoticed. This is surprising, in light of the ample 
evidence in the literature suggesting that institutional investors are better informed than other 
market participants (Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993); Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1997); Nofsinger and Sias (1999); Wermers (1999, 2000); Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers 
(2000); and Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003)) and of recent survey evidence indicating that a 
large majority of institutional investors either directly engages in or favors coordination of 
shareholder activism measures (McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010)).
17
 In this study we refer 
to shareholder coordination when institutional shareholders are linked via informal social 
networks that are formed based on the principle of geographic proximity- and values-based 
homophily.
18
 The information transfer in these networks occurs through social interactions and 
                                                          
17
 Institutional investors’ superior information and trading activities have been shown to mitigate anomalies such as 
post-earnings announcement drift (Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000)) and to facilitate price adjustment to 
new information (Badrinath, Kale, and Noe (1995); Sias and Starks (1997)). 
 
18
 Informal ties between institutional shareholders exist and continuously develop based on the principle of 
homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with others driven by familiarity emanating from 
geographic proximity or from sharing common values (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001)). 
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word-of-mouth exchanges among people connected through friendship, common background, 
shared environs, etc. Moreover, the way information diffuses among investors can influence 
trading patterns, with investors linked in a network displaying more similar trading behavior 
(Bildik, Ozgul, Walden, and Yavuz (2013)). 
 We argue that coordination among institutional shareholders should further encourage 
the collection of and trading on private information, and therefore it should lead to more 
informative prices. Our investigation is motivated by the ample evidence that information 
sharing with peers through social networks is an important factor that affects both fund managers’ 
and households’ investment decisions (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Hong, Kubik and 
Stein (2004, 2005); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007); and Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008, 
2010)). There is also recent evidence that online social networks that facilitate information 
sharing among fund managers may be aiding the price discovery process (Gray and Kern (2011)). 
In a theoretical context, Colla and Mele (2010) show that in the presence of information linkages 
among traders, volume and price informativeness increase. In our study, we focus on networks 
linking institutional investors and hypothesize that such networks encourage the collection of 
private information and facilitate the diffusion of such information into prices via institutional 
investor trading.  
Whereas prior studies of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and 
informational efficiency primarily focus on either the level of institutional ownership or on 
institutions’ trading behavior, in this paper we investigate the influence of shareholder 
coordination on stock price informativeness. To measure the degree of coordination among 
institutional investors, we follow Huang (2013a) and devise two proxies that rely on the premise 
that the likelihood and strength of social connections increase with geographic proximity and 
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similarity of values, attitudes, and beliefs comprising their corporate investment philosophy. The 
first proxy is the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance among institutional 
shareholders (hereafter COORD_PROX) and the second one is the weighted average correlation 
among institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings (hereafter COORD_PORT). 
 Our results show a significantly positive relation between the degree of shareholder 
coordination and the amount of firm-specific information impounded into stock prices as 
measured by idiosyncratic volatility. Consistent with the notion that the stable 
information-sharing networks are more likely to develop among active monitors, we also find 
that shareholder coordination among independent institutions is the main driver for both 
shareholder coordination measures in the positive relation between coordination and stock price 
informativeness.
19
 In the same vein, we further provide evidence of a significant positive 
relationship between shareholder coordination among dedicated institutions and stock price 
informativeness, whereas the relationship is insignificant in the case of coordination among 
transient institutions. 
 To address potential concerns about endogeneity and reverse causality, we conduct a 
battery of tests, including change-on-change analysis, generalized method of moments (GMM) 
dynamic panel estimation analysis, instrumental variable (IV) analysis, unexplained shareholder 
coordination analysis, and firm fixed effect analysis. Our results hold in each test. 
 To ensure the robustness of our findings, we also conduct tests using several alternative 
measures of price informativeness, such as the probability of information-based trading (PIN) 
developed by Easley, Kiefer, O'Hara (1997a, b), adjusted PIN (ADJ_PIN) developed by Duarte 
and Young (2009), and price impact of Amihud (2002) (AMIHUD_PI). All of these tests provide 
                                                          
19
 Following Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) we classify mutual funds and independent investment advisors as 
independent institutions and classify bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions as grey institutions. 
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further support for the notion that coordination among institutional shareholders improves stock 
price informativeness. In addition, we conduct further robustness tests to rule out the possibility 
that our results are driven by the other factors that prior studies have shown to be related to 
informativeness. Specifically, Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that firms with stronger corporate 
governance display higher levels of stock price informativeness. Bushee and Noe (2000) find 
that firms’ financial reporting transparency is positively related to idiosyncratic volatility. Our 
results show that the inclusion of corporate governance and accounting transparency does not 
substitute for or replace the coordination-price informativeness relation. Consistent with the 
findings in Jin and Myers (2005) and Ferreira and Laux (2007), the positive impact of accounting 
transparency on idiosyncratic volatility is also confirmed in our results. 
 In the final part of our paper, we test whether institutional trading is a mechanism through 
which shareholder coordination enhances price informativeness. Specifically, we hypothesize 
that increased institutional trading would facilitate faster incorporation of privately collected 
firm-specific information into stock prices. We reason that a high degree of shareholder 
coordination makes the collection of and trading on private information easier, thereby 
improving stock price informativeness. We provide direct evidence in support of the notion that 
institutional trading is partially responsible for the impact of coordination on informativeness. 
Specifically, the relation between shareholder coordination and price informativeness is even 
stronger for stocks that are intensely traded by institutional investors.  
 Our study is timely in that it applies what practitioners such as fund managers have long 
regarded as an important tool in monitoring managers (e.g., McCahery, Sautner, and Starks 
(2010)). Understanding the impact of shareholder coordination on stock prices is essential in 
evaluating the intricacies of the role played by institutional investors in corporate information 
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environment. As an empirical extension of the theoretical work by Colla and Mele (2010), we 
contribute to the social networks’ literature by showing that information sharing networks linking 
institutions enhance stock price informativeness. Our work also contributes to the microstructure 
literature on information-based trading. While prior research focuses on corporate governance 
(e.g., Ferriera and Laux (2007); Ferriera, Ferriera, and Raposo (2011); Gul, Srinidhi and Ng 
(2011); and Yu (2011)), corporate disclosure (Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Haggard, Martin, 
and Pereira (2008)), and legal regimes (Fernandes and Ferreira (2009)) as determinants for 
idiosyncratic volatility, our paper documents a new determinant, shareholder coordination, for 
price informativeness. Finally, our study is the first to establish shareholder coordination and 
subsequent trading activity as a source of firms’ improved information environment. Our 
findings have important implications for the real economy, because more informative prices 
facilitate better-informed financing and investment decisions (e.g., Chen, Goldstein and Jiang 
(2007)) and Foucault and Gehrig (2008)). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents literature review 
and construction of main variables. Section 3 describes the sample used in this paper. Section 4 
contains empirical results. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review, Hypothesis Development and Construction of Main Variables  
 
2.1 Shareholder Coordination and Stock Price Informativeness 
 The importance of social networks has been recently realized by financial researchers. 
Literature has shown that social networks can influence investment decisions. Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2001) find that social networks rooted in distance, language, and culture have a 
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substantial influence on household investment decisions. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004, 2005) 
and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) document that investment decisions of households and 
mutual fund managers are strongly affected by their “neighbors” through the word-of-mouth 
communications. Investigating the education networks between corporate board members and 
mutual fund managers, Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008) provide evidence that mutual fund 
managers gain information advantages through connections and thereby perform better on those 
“connected” stocks. Gray and Kern (2011) further document that on line social networks 
facilitate information sharing among fund managers and thereby the price discovery process. 
Theoretically, Colla and Mele (2010) show that information linkages among traders facilitate 
information diffusion and enhance price informativeness. Therefore, it is conceivable that the 
information sharing networks among institutional shareholders can also facilitate the information 
transmission and accelerate the price discovery process.  
  If social networks linking institutions facilitate information diffusion between 
nodes and improve corporate information environment, we should observe that substantial 
information flows into stock prices for firms with strong information sharing network. The 
testable implication is that firms with a higher degree of shareholder coordination are associated 
with more informative stock prices.  
 
2.2 Development of Shareholder Coordination Measures 
Social network literature suggests that these are more likely to develop when there is 
homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with others driven by 
familiarity, often rooted in geographic proximity or sharing of common values. The homophily 
principle that familiarity breeds connection is well established in the social networks’ literature. 
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Geographic proximity has been shown to be influential in the development of close relationships, 
such as friendship and marriage (Bossard (1932)), in the frequency of communications within 
firms (Allen (1984)), in the forming of interlocked corporate boards (Kono, Palmer, Friedland, 
and Zafonte (1998)), in dealings among floor traders (Baker (1984)), and in investment patterns 
of venture capital firms (Sorenson and Stuart (2001)). In addition to propinquity, studies have 
shown that relationships are more likely when individuals share similar backgrounds, 
demographic characteristics and values (e.g. Marsden (1988); McPherson, Smith-Lovin and 
Cook (2001)).  
  Finance literature has also shown that geographic proximity or sharing of 
common values facilitate communications and the exchange of ideas, and thereby forms the 
social ties (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004, 2005); Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner (2007)). Therefore, we first conjecture that institutions that are geographically 
close to each other are more likely to share information, allowing for faster price-relevant 
information diffusion among other market participants and, ultimately, more informative stock 
prices. In addition to geographic proximity-driven homophily, social networks linking 
institutional investors can also develop based on common values, or common background (e.g. in 
terms of education, military service, work experience) of institutions’ managers. Such value- and 
status homophily based network ties should foster the development of a shared set of investment 
philosophy dimensions across linked institutions. Thus, we argue that shareholder coordination 
can exist even without geographic proximity and will be reflected in the correlations among the 
investment portfolio allocations of institutional investors. Moreover, one can envision that 
institutions sharing common investment philosophies (high portfolio correlation) are more 
inclined to maintain coordination through an information sharing network in the foreseeable 
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future in order to achieve mutual benefits. In fact, portfolio correlations can be the result of 
exposure to homogeneous information sources within a network that is based on either 
geographic location (Gaspar and Massa (2007)), communication due to geographic proximity 
(Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005)), or social ties (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008)). Therefore, 
we propose to use both geographic proximity and portfolio correlation among institutional 
investors as two measures of shareholder coordination. 
The first measure of coordination is based on geographic distance between institutional 
investors. We identify the location of institutions by collecting their headquarter address zip code 
information from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents (SEC Edgar). We 
obtain the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database. Following prior research (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz 
(2001)), we calculate the distance between institution i and j using the following standard 
formula:  
Di,j = r arccos{cos(lati)cos(loni)cos(latj)cos(lonj)+cos(lati)sin(loni)cos(latj)sin(lonj)+sin(lati)sin(latj)}  (1) 
where Di,j is distance in statutory miles, r denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 3,963 
statutory miles), and lat and lon are institution latitudes and longitudes. 
 Following Huang (2013a), for each firm-quarter, we first calculate the distance of each 
institutional investor of the firm and all institutional shareholders of the firm, weighted by their 
respective fractional holdings of the total institutional ownership in the firm. We then take the 
product of minus one with the logarithm-transformed fractional holdings weighted-average of 
these distances across all institutional shareholders of the firm to obtain the 
geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination measure for each firm-quarter.
24
 The 
                                                          
24
 In the following regression analysis, we take the simple average of shareholder coordination over the four 
quarters in the past year t-1. 
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weighting scheme delivers a more accurate gauge of coordination than the simple average of the 
distances among institutions, because it accounts for the fact that institutions with large 
shareholdings typically have a more substantial impact on corporate governance. Specifically, 
the geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination measure is designed as follows: 
                    i j i , j
i α j α
C O O R D _ P R O X = - L O G ( 1 + w w D I S T )
 
                  (2) 
where α is the set of institutional investors, wi is the ownership weight of institution i in the total 
ownership held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and DISTi.j is the 
geographic distance between institution i and j. The logarithm transformation, log (1 + 
weighted-average of geographic distance between institutions) serves the purpose of reducing the 
skewness of this variable’s distribution.  
 The second measure of shareholder coordination is the weighted average correlation 
between institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings. The intuition behind this measure is based on 
the premise that institutions with similar portfolio allocations are more likely to share common 
investment philosophies and therefore they are more likely to have developed social links that 
lead to better coordination. Additionally, stronger connectedness among institutions based on 
similarities of their portfolio allocations may also motivate them to coordinate their monitoring 
efforts and corporate governance roles.  
 To calculate the portfolio correlation among institutional investors for each firm-quarter, 
we first identify the stocks held by each institutional investor at the end of each quarter, and then 
calculate the correlation of the excess portfolio weights
26
 on the stocks held by both institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
26
 The excess portfolio weight allocated to stock i in quarter t is given by:  
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For each institutional shareholder of the firm, we calculate the correlation of its portfolio with 
that of all institutions, weighted by their respective fractional holdings of all institutional 
ownership in the firm. As in the geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination measure, 
we then take the fractional holdings weighted-average of these portfolio correlations across all 
institutional shareholders of the firm to obtain the portfolio-correlation-based shareholder 
coordination measure for each firm-quarter. Specifically, 
                       i j i , j
i α j α
C O O R D _ P O R T = w w C O R R
 
                      (3) 
where α is the set of institutional investors,    is the ownership weight of institution i in the 
total ownership held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and CORR  j is the 
correlation coefficient of the excess portfolio weight (measured as the actual weight relative to 
the weight in the market portfolio) allocated to common holdings between institutions i and j at 
quarter t. 
 
2.3 Development of Stock Price Informativeness Measures 
 We use idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ) as our main proxy for stock price informativeness. 
French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) state that idiosyncratic volatility, defined as stock return 
variation unexplained by market movements, measures the rate of firm-specific information 
impounded into stock prices. Previous empirical studies support the view that idiosyncratic 
volatility measures the rate of information flow into stock prices. For instance, Durnev et al. 
(2003) show that the stock prices of firms with more idiosyncratic volatility embed more 
information about future earnings. Idiosyncratic volatility is also commonly used in empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
where     is the actual weight assigned to stock i in the institution’s portfolio pin quarter t and      is the weight 
of stock i in the aggregate market portfolio in quarter t. 
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studies to proxy for the informativeness of stock prices (e.g., Ferreira and Laux (2007); Ferreira, 
Ferreira, and Raposo (2011)). 
 We estimate annual ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic volatility by regressing stock returns on 
the three Fama-French model factors. For each ﬁrm-year, ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation is 
estimated by 2
i,t
1- R from the regression: 
    
f m f
i,t t 0 1 t t 2 t 3 t i,tr - r = β +β (r - r ) +β SMB +β HML +e  (4) 
where i,tr  is the return of stock i in day t, 
f
t
r is the risk-free rate of return in day t, m
t
r is the 
value-weighted market return, SMB (small minus big) is the difference between the monthly 
returns of the small and big firms’ portfolios, and HML (high minus low) is the difference 
between the monthly returns of high book-to-market and low book-to-market firms’ portfolios. 
Since 2
i,t
1- R is skewed (Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2004)), we take the logistic 
transformation of 2
i,t
1- R to ensure a normality distribution. Formally, idiosyncratic volatility i,tψ
is defined as: 
                          
2
i , t
i , t 2
i , t
1 - R
ψ = L n ( )
R
                               (5) 
 Alternatively, following Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2006), we also use the augmented 
market model with the inclusion of an industry index to estimate idiosyncratic volatility 
(Ψ_MKT). 
 To provide further support to our interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of 
stock price informativeness, we use several alternative proxies that are commonly used in prior 
literature. The first measure is the probability of information-based trading (PIN) measure 
developed by Easley et al. (1997a, b). The PIN measure proxies for the probability of informed 
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trading estimated from a structural market microstructure model.
27
 Our second measure is 
adjusted PIN (ADJ_PIN) developed by Duarte and Young (2009), who argue that the PIN 
measure of Easley et al. (2002) is an imperfect measurement of private information because PIN 
may capture some illiquidity effects that are not related to private information.
28
 They augment 
the PIN measure by decomposing it into a private information component and a liquidity 
component. The ADJ_PIN variable is the annual component of PIN related to private information 
and serves as a clearer measure of private information. Finally, as an alternative measure of price 
informativeness, we use the price impact measure of Amihud (2002). This measure is deﬁned as 
the annual average of the daily ratio between a stock’s absolute return and its dollar volume 
(multiplied by 10
6
): 
iD
it
t=1i it
r1
AMIHUD_PI =
D VOLD
                         (6) 
where Di is the annual number of valid observation days for stock i and VOLDit is the dollar 
volume of stock i on day t. The ratio is measured as the absolute percentage price change per 
dollar of daily trading volume. More informed trading would induce greater price impact as 
dealers price protect themselves from adverse selections (Kyle (1985)). Therefore, the magnitude 
of the price impact should be positively associated with the perceived amount of informed 
trading on a stock. 
                                                          
27
 Previous empirical work supports the use of PIN as a proxy for stock price informativeness. For example, Vega 
(2006) finds that stocks associated with high PIN experience low or insignificant drift, which is consistent with the 
notion that their prices incorporate more private information and become more informative. Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2007) find the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices increases when PIN is high, suggesting that 
managers learn from the private information incorporated into stock prices. Ferreira and Laux (2007) find that firms 
with fewer antitakeover provisions display high PIN, supporting the hypothesis that strong shareholder protection 
enhances stock price informativeness by encouraging private information collection and trading. Ferreira, Ferreira 
and Raposo (2011) document a negative relation between corporate board structure PIN, supporting the hypothesis 
that stock price informativeness and board monitoring are substitutes.  
28
 We thank Jefferson Duarte for providing access to the PIN data. The PIN and ADJ_PIN data are only available 
from years 1983 to 2004. Thus, our sample size drops when using PIN and ADJ_PIN as alternative measures of 
stock price informativeness. 
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 Several studies show that better shareholder protection is associated with greater stock 
price informativeness. For example, Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) argue that greater firm-specific 
stock price variation (i.e., greater idiosyncratic volatility or less synchronicity of returns across 
firms) is associated with stronger investor property rights. Ferreira and Laux (2007) provide 
direct evidence that strong shareholder protection encourages investors to collect and trade on 
private information, leading to informative stock prices. Therefore, in our multivariate tests we 
control for shareholder protection as measured by the G-index developed by Gompers, Ishii and 
Metrick (2003).  
 Accounting transparency provides more reliable public information about firms. 
Literature suggests that high disclosure quality encourages the collection of private information 
and leads to subsequent intense trading, causing stock prices to be more informative. Bushee and 
Noe (2000) find that disclosure ratings, which are based on analysts’ assessments of 
informativeness of corporate disclosure practices, are positively associated with stock return 
volatility.  Jin and Myers (2006) show that poor country-level governance and accounting 
opaqueness induce low idiosyncratic volatility. Ferreira and Laux (2007) extend the 
country-level evidence to firm level by showing that accounting transparency is positively 
associated with idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, we also control for the transparency of firm’s 
financial reporting in our tests.  
 
3. Sample  
 We draw the data for our study from the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) 
Database, COMPUSTAT, the Thomson Reuters F13 Institutional Holdings database. Our initial 
sample includes all firms in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT-F13 merged database for the period from 
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1994 to 2010, omitting financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999). We 
winsorize all continuous variables at the bottom and top 1% levels. Appendix A deﬁnes in detail 
the variables used in this study. 
 Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics of our data. Panel A shows that the mean value of 
idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ) is 2.586 with the standard deviation of 1.872. Panel B of Table 2.1 
presents summary statistics for the two measures of shareholder coordination. The average 
geographic-proximity-based shareholder coordination (COORD_PROX) is -5.975. The average 
portfolio-correlation-based shareholder coordination (COORD_PORT) is 0.290. Both of the 
coordination measures exhibit a fair degree of cross-sectional variation across sample firms. 
Table 2.1 also presents summary statistics for other shareholder characteristics and firm 
characteristics. In particular, institutional shareholders, on average, own 43.3% of the 
outstanding shares of the average firm. Following Hartzell and Starks (2003), we calculate 
institutional ownership concentration as a Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership 
concentration (IO_HHI) based on the percentages of institutional holdings by all 13F institutions. 
The mean value of IO_HHI is 0.021. These statistics (and others in Table 1) are comparable to 
those in other studies (e.g., Ferreira and Laux (2007) and Huang (2013b)). 
 Table 2.2 shows the correlation matrix. The stock price informativeness measures, Ψ, 
Ψ_MKT, PIN, adjusted PIN, and Amihud price impact (AMIHUD_PI) are positively and 
significantly correlated with each other, supporting the idea that these measures capture the same 
phenomenon. The correlations between shareholder coordination and all stock price 
informativeness measures are positive and significant, consistent with our prediction that firms 
with a higher degree of shareholder coordination are associated with more informative stock 
prices. As expected, the two shareholder coordination measures, COORD_PROX and 
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COORD_PORT, are highly correlated with each other (Pearson = 0.648), suggesting that, 
although constructed in different ways, both measures capture similar aspects of shareholder 
coordination. Given the fact that shareholder coordination is negatively correlated with 
institutional ownership and ownership concentration, we expand our Ferreira and Laux (2007) 
baseline model by adding the institutional ownership and ownership concentration variables to 
alleviate concerns about omitted variable effects.   
 
4. Empirical Regression Models and Results  
 In this section, we establish our baseline model and provide regression evidence on the 
relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. 
 
4.1 Impact of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness  
 4.1.1 Empirical design: baseline model. We estimate the following baseline empirical 
model to analyze the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness.  
        
i , t 0 1 i , t - 1 2 i , t - 1 3 i , t - 1 4 i , t - 1 5 i , t - 1 6 i , t - 1
7 I , t - 1 8 i , t - 1 9 i , t - 1 1 0 i , t - 1 1 1 I , t - 1 j t i , t
ψ = β + β + β + β β S I Z E + β M B + β R O E
+β V R O E + β L E V + β D D + β A G E + β D I V E R + d + d + ε
C O O R D _ I O I O _ H H I +
,
   (7) 
where i indexes firm, j indexes industry, and t indexes year. Industry and year indicators are 
denoted by dj and dt, respectively. COORD_ is one of shareholder coordination measures for firm 
i at year t-1: geographic-proximity-based coordination (COORD_PROX) or 
portfolio-correlation-based coordination (COORD_PORT). We include a number of control 
variables drawn from the literature on price informativeness. These control variables include 
institutional ownership (IO), institutional ownership concentration (IO_HHI), market 
capitalization (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (MB), firm profitability (ROE), profits volatility 
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(VROE), leverage (LEV), a dividend payer dummy (DD), firm age (AGE), and an internal 
diversification dummy (DIVER). Year dummies are included to account for pervasive 
macro-economy factors that affect the cross-section of firms, and industry dummies are included 
to control the unobservable industry characteristics that could be drivers of the results. We 
estimate equation (7) as a pooled cross-sectional time-series model. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm level to control for time series dependence within the firm that could bias the statistics 
as suggested in Peterson (2009) and Thompson (2011).  
      4.1.2 Regression results. Table 2.3 presents the baseline regression results on the relation 
between shareholder coordination and idiosyncratic volatility Ψ estimated from regression model 
(4). This table reports restricted versions of the baseline model as well as full versions with the 
complete set of control variables.  
 Columns (1) and (4) report restricted regression results with shareholder coordination as 
the only regressor. There is a significant positive relation between shareholder coordination and 
idiosyncratic volatility. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on the geographic-proximity-based 
(portfolio-based) shareholder coordination is 0.604 (5.662) with a t-statistic of 60.88 (52.05). It is 
clear that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness. Including other control 
variables does not change the qualitative results. Columns (2) and (5) include the same control 
variables as in previous studies (e.g., Ferreira and Laux (2007)). Although the coefficients and 
robust t-statistics are predictably attenuated, the results confirm the significantly positive relation 
between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. Considering the significant 
correlation between shareholder coordination and institutional ownership as well as institutional 
ownership concentration shown in Panel A of Table 2.1, we decided to also explore the full 
model that includes both variables in the baseline regression in order to rule out the possibility 
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that omitted variables can drive our results. The coefficient estimates for the full models are 
reported in Columns (3) and (6). As we can see, the significantly positive relation between 
coordination and stock price informativeness still holds. The relation is also economically 
significant: controlling for other firm characteristics, a one-standard deviation increase in 
COORD_PROX (COORD_PORT) enhances Ψ by about 1.7% (9.6%) relative to the 
unconditional sample mean of Ψ.   
 
4.2 Impact of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness, by Institution Type 
 Existing literature shows that different types of shareholders may differ in their incentives 
and abilities to play a governance role. Therefore, it is also possible that the strength of 
information sharing networks linking institutional investors might vary depending on the type of 
institutions involved. To investigate this issue, we first follow Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) 
and classify institutions into independent and grey institutions according to their potential for 
having business ties to the firm. Independent institutions include mutual funds and investment 
advisory firms, which are likely to have fewer potential business relationships with the 
corporations in which they invest. Grey institutions include bank trusts, insurance companies, 
and other institutions, which have current or prospective business relationships with corporations 
in which they invest. We then construct separate shareholder coordination measures among 
independent and grey institutions, respectively. We expect that stronger information sharing 
networks are more likely to develop among institutions not subject to conflicts of interest or legal 
constraints associated with having a business relationship with the firm. Accordingly, we predict 
that the effect of shareholder coordination on stock price informativeness should be driven 
mainly by independent institutions. The results shown in Columns (1) and (3) of Table 2.4 are 
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consistent with our expectation: the positive impact of shareholder coordination on stock price 
informativeness is strong and always significant in the case of independent institutions, whereas 
it is much weaker and only significant in one of the two models in the case of grey institutions. 
 Second, following Bushee (2001), we classify institutions into dedicated and transient 
institutions. Dedicated institutions’ investments are associated with low turnover, low 
diversification, and long investment horizon. Therefore, dedicated institutions are more likely to 
play an important role in corporate governance and to be proponents of a better informational 
environment for the firms in which they invest. Transient institutions, which are characterized by 
high turnover, high diversification, and short investment horizon, are less likely to engage in 
corporate governance and less likely to espouse the view that benefits from an improved 
information environment significantly outweighs the costs associated with promoting 
informativeness.  
 Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2.4 present the results of the regressions that include 
shareholder coordination measures among dedicated and transient institutions. Consistent with 
the notion that dedicated institutions are more effective monitors and promoters of a transparent 
information environment of firms they invest in, we find that only coordination among dedicated 
institutions has a significant positive impact on stock price informativeness. It is noteworthy that, 
although the coordination among transient institutions enters the regressions with a negative sign, 
the coefficients are insignificant. 
 To summarize, we find that the stock price informativeness varies with shareholder 
coordination by different institution types in systematic ways that are consistent with the view 
that the higher degree of shareholder coordination encourages the collection of and trading on 
private information, and thereby leads to more informative stock prices.  
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4.3 Establishing causality 
 As endogeneity can be a serious concern, the results so far do not allow us to draw a 
strong conclusion regarding the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price 
informativeness. It is possible that institutional investors don’t invest randomly so that what we 
label the “shareholder coordination effect” may just be a reflection of preferences by 
geographically clustered institutions or by institutions sharing similar portfolio allocations 
favoring firms with stronger stock price informativeness. To address this concern, we use 
different regression methods to establish the directional link in this relationship.  
4.3.1 Change-on-change regressions. Since the relationship between coordination and  
price informativeness could be bi-directional, we explore several methods in order to empirically 
establish the direction of causality. We first employ the change-on-change regression model as 
used in Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) and Chhaochharia, Kumar and 
Niessen-Ruenzi (2011). If the degree of shareholder coordination has a significant influence on 
stock price informativeness as our results imply, then as shareholder coordination increases over 
time, we would expect to see corresponding increases in stock price informativeness. If causality 
runs only in this direction, then increases in stock price informativeness should not drive increases 
in shareholder coordination.  
  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2.5 report the results for regression models with changes in 
stock price informativeness as the dependent variable and lagged changes in shareholder 
coordination as the main independent variable. The dependent variable ΔΨt is the change in stock 
price informativness from year t-1 to year t. The main independent variable (ΔCOORD_PROXt-1 
in Column (1) and ΔCOORD_PORTt-1 in Column (2)) is the change in shareholder coordination 
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from year t-2 to year t-1. All other independent variables are also expressed in terms of changes 
from year t-2 to year t-1. The coefficient estimates on the change in shareholder coordination are 
positive and significant.  
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5 report the results for regression models with changes in 
shareholder coordination as the dependent variable and lagged changes in stock price 
informativeness as the main independent variable. In contrast to the results shown in Columns (1) 
and (2), the coefficient estimates on the change in idiosyncratic volatility (ΔΨt-1) are not 
statistically significant, indicating that changes in stock price informativeness don’t have any 
effect on subsequent changes in shareholder coordination. This evidence indicates that the causal 
link from shareholder coordination to stock price informativeness is considerably stronger than 
the reverse causal relation. 
4.3.2 Firm fixed effect regressions. To further establish the causal relation between 
shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness, we employ the firm fixed effects 
model which accounts for the impact of any unobserved firm effects on the relation. The results 
with firm fixed effects are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.6. We find that even after 
controlling firm fixed effects along with year fixed effects, the positive impact of shareholder 
coordination on stock price informativeness is still strong, both statistically and economically. 
Specifically, we find that the coefficient estimate on COORD_PROX is 0.031, which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-statistic=3.32). A one-standard deviation increase in 
COORD_PROX will cause Ψ to increase by 1.4% relative to the sample mean. This evidence is 
consistent with our hypothesis and partially addresses the endogeneity concern.  
      4.3.3 Unexplained shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. In this 
subsection, we design a prediction model that captures the effect of firm characteristics on 
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shareholder coordination, and then examine the relation between unexplained shareholder 
coordination and stock price informativeness. The rationale is that the predicted shareholder 
coordination is a linear combination of firm characteristics and as such it could be endogenously 
determined. Thus, if firm characteristics used to predict shareholder coordination also explain 
most of the variation in price informativeness, then the positive relation between shareholder 
coordination and price informativeness could be explained by the notion that shareholder 
coordination simply acts as an aggregate proxy for those firm characteristics. Conversely, if the 
part of shareholder coordination that cannot be explained by firm characteristics, i.e. the residual 
from a prediction model explains most of the variation in the variables of interest, then it is more 
likely that we have established a causal relation between them. 
 To obtain the unexplained (residual) shareholder coordination measure, we use a 
methodology similar to that used by Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) and Nagel (2005) in different 
contexts. Given the fact that there is neither any prior theoretical model nor prior empirical 
evidence regarding the determinants of shareholder coordination, we include a battery of 
variables that reflect firm characteristics (e.g., market capitalization (SIZE), accounting 
performance (ROA) and market performance (BM, BETA and BHRET12)) in the prediction 
model. Considering the way we construct shareholder coordination variables, we also include the 
percentage of institutional ownership (IO) and institutional ownership concentration (IO_HHI) to 
control for their potential impact on the degree of shareholder coordination. Finally, our 
prediction model is as follows:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
COORD_ = a + a SIZE + a BM + a BETA + a ROA + a LEV + a SALE_GROWTH 
+ a  + a IO + a IO_HHI + a BHRET12 + εAGE
    (8) 
 We estimate this cross-sectional regression of shareholder coordination every quarter 
with lagged independent variables and obtain coefficient estimations of each controlling variable, 
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which we then use to obtain predicted shareholder coordination for each firm and each quarter. 
After obtaining the predicted shareholder coordination, we obtain the unexplained part for 
geographic-proximity-based (RES_COORD_PROX) and portfolio-correlation-based 
(RES_COORD_PORT) shareholder coordination. 
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.6 report the results for regressions using residual 
shareholder coordination as the main explanatory variable. Unexplained shareholder 
coordination still has a significant positive impact on stock price informativeness.  
      4.3.4 Instrumental variables method. We also utilize instrumental variables method to 
alleviate any remaining concerns of endogeneity. Under standard identification assumptions, we 
apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) tests to isolate the effect of shareholder coordination on 
idiosyncratic volatility. This procedure requires valid instruments for shareholder coordination 
that meet the criteria: (1) strong correlation with shareholder coordination; and (2) orthogonality 
with idiosyncratic volatility except indirectly through other independent variables. 
 Following Gaspar and Massa (2007), we use a series of binary variables that represent 
location dummies of the major 21 cities or metropolitan areas
29
 in the U.S., plus a dummy for a 
firm located in a remote city. A remote city is defined as a city located more than 150 miles away 
from one of the 21 major cities. Specifically, the location dummies take the value of one if a firm 
is located in any of the major 21 cities or a remote city in the U.S, and zero otherwise. These 
variables represent ideal instruments as the location of the institutional investor is not directly 
related to informativeness but could have an impact on shareholder coordination. Specifically, 
clustering of institutions in major cities provides money managers a greater chance to 
                                                          
29
 We obtain the list of the major cities by US Census Bureau population surveys of 1990 and 2000. The full list of 
the cities is as follows: New York, San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, 
Baltimore, Washington, San Diego, Milwaukee, Detroit, Phoenix, Columbus, Indianapolis, Austin, San Antonio, 
Jacksonville, Memphis, and San Jose. 
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communicate and exchange their private information, leading to better coordination.
30
 To 
formally assess the quality of the instruments in each of the 2SLS regressions, we perform the 
following two tests: (1) a Cragg and Donald (1993) instrument relevance test; and (2) a Hansen 
overidentification test to examine the instrument orthogonality. 
 Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.6 report the results for 2SLS regressions. In Column (5), 
we use idiosyncratic volatility Ψ as the dependent variable and the instrumented COORD_PROX 
as the main independent variable. We find that the coefficient estimate on the instrumented 
shareholder coordination COORD_PROX is still positive and significant at the 5% level. In 
addition, the p-value for the Cragg and Donald (1993) F test is less than 0.001, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that instruments are weak. The p-value of the overidentification test (Hansen test) is 
0.556, suggesting that the null hypotheses of orthogonality of instruments with the errors is not 
rejected. The results of instrument validity tests lead us to not reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument suitability. Results for shareholder coordination, COORD_PORT, are consistent. Thus, 
our finding that shareholder coordination enhances stock price informativeness appears to be 
robust to controlling for endogeneity concerns, suggesting a causal link between them.  
      4.3.5 GMM estimation. As another causality check, we use the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) dynamic panel estimation method, which is robust to endogeneity problems 
due to reverse causality, simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Wintoki, Linck, and 
Netter (2012)).  
We report the results in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.6. Results from the GMM 
analysis confirm our early findings. The coefficient estimate of shareholder coordination is 
significantly positive for both measures: COORD_PROX (coefficient=0.140, t-statistic=2.22) 
                                                          
30
 Hong, Kubik and Stein (2005) find that a mutual fund manager’s investment decision is more likely to be affected 
by the investment decision of other managers in the same city through the word-of-mouth effects. 
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and COORD_PORT (coefficient=1.046, t-statistic=2.41). As we can see, the GMM coefficient 
estimate is much larger than the OLS coefficient estimate, which could be due to a reduction in 
the measurement error. Table 6 also reports the results of specification tests for the validity of the 
GMM estimation procedure. If the assumptions of the specification are valid, then residuals in 
the first differences (AR(1)) should be correlated, but uncorrelated in the second differences 
(AR(2)). Results of these tests confirm that these are indeed the case. The Hansen test for 
over-identifying restrictions (J-statistic) shows that under the null hypothesis of instrument 
validity, we cannot reject that our GMM instruments are valid. As GMM accounts for 
time-invariant firm heterogeneities, we also control for year- and industry- fixed effects in the 
GMM regression. 
Taken together, the evidence from various causality tests strongly suggests that a high 
degree of shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness but not vice versa. 
 
4.4 Alternative Measures of Stock Price Informativeness 
 To substantiate our informational interpretation of the coordination-idiosyncratic 
volatility relationship, we next test for the relation between shareholder coordination and several 
alternative price informativeness measures.  
 Specifically, we use idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ_MKT) following Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2007); probability of information-based trading (PIN) as used in Easley, Hvidkjaer and 
O’Hara (2002); the adjusted probability of information-based trading (ADJ_PIN) following 
Duarte and Young (2009); and the Amihud price impact measure (AMIHUD_PI) as used in 
Amihud (2002). Table 2.7 reports the regression results using the alternative measures of stock 
price informativeness. Overall, the results support our hypothesis that firms with stronger 
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shareholder coordination have more informative stock prices. Results in Columns (1) and (2) 
show a strong and positive relation between shareholder coordination and Ψ_MKT, suggesting 
that our findings are not specific to the particular model used to estimate idiosyncratic volatility. 
The regressions whose results are shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.7 use the annual 
probability of information trading (PIN) measure as the dependent variable. We find that PIN is 
also positively related to shareholder coordination, which supports our hypothesis that firms with 
a higher degree of shareholder coordination are more subject to private information trading. 
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.7 present estimates using adjusted PIN (ADJ_PIN) measure as 
proposed by Duarte and Young (2009), who argue that PIN may capture some illiquidity effects 
that are not related to private information. We find that ADJ_PIN is also positively related to 
shareholder coordination. The coefficients of shareholder coordination (COORD_PROX and 
COORD_PORT) are positive and significant, although their magnitude and significance is lower 
compared to those in Columns (3) and (4). The results for regressions using Amihud price impact 
measure (AMIHUD_PI) as an alternative price informativeness measure are reported in Columns 
(7) and (8). Again, the positive relation between shareholder coordination and price 
informativeness is confirmed.  
 Overall, our results on alternative measures of stock price informativeness confirm our 
earlier findings that firms with stronger shareholder coordination have more informed stock 
prices. Our robustness results further substantiate our interpretation that shareholder coordination 
promotes private information collection and leads to more informed stock prices. 
  
 83 
4.5 Robustness 
 In this section, we show that our primary findings are robust to controls for corporate 
governance, accounting transparency, and also the use of other alternative methodologies. 
      4.5.1 Controlling for corporate governance. Ferreira and Laux (2007) show that 
corporate governance, measured by G-index, encourages the collection of and trading on private 
information, in particular via merger arbitrage trading. We proxy for corporate governance using 
the G-index (G) developed by Gompers et al. (2003). Higher G-index represents more 
anti-takeover related governance provisions and therefore weaker corporate governance. The 
results of regressions controlling for corporate governance are shown in Columns (1) and (4) of 
Table 2.8. Consistent with our earlier evidence, shareholder coordination continues to exhibit 
significant positive association with stock price informativeness, suggesting that the effect of 
shareholder coordination on price informativeness is not captured by the existing measures of 
corporate governance.  
      4.5.2 Controlling for accounting transparency. Theories predict that more accounting 
transparency can either promote or discourage private information collection (Kim and 
Verrecchia (1991, 2001)). Jin and Myers (2006) find cross-country evidence that more 
accounting transparency is associated with higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. We measure 
accounting transparency using proxies in the earnings management literature. A number of 
studies show that earnings management reduces the information content of accounting reports 
(e.g., Trueman and Titman (1988)). Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Jayaraman (2008) find that 
discretionary earnings management reduces the information content of earnings and cash flow 
and therefore accounting transparency. Therefore, we use earnings management to proxy for 
accounting transparency.  
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 To capture the level of earnings management, we construct two measures. Following 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), the first measure of earnings management 
(EM_MODJONES) is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated from the modified 
Jones model as the difference between total current accruals (TCA)
31
 and nondiscretionary 
accruals (NDA)
32
. The second measure of earnings management is absolute value of 
performance-matched discretionary accruals as used in Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005). As in 
the case of the first measure, we estimate the modified Jones model cross-sectionally using all 
firm-year observations in the same two-digit SIC code to obtain discretionary accruals. Then we 
match the firm with a firm with the same two-digit SIC code and with the closest return on assets 
in the current year and use the difference of discretionary accruals between them as the 
performance-matched earnings management (EM_PERMATCH). 
 The results of the regressions are reported in Columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) in Table 2.8. 
We employ EM_MODJONES in columns (2) and (5), and EM_PERMATCH in columns (3) and 
(6). The coefficient estimates on both earnings management measures are significant and 
negative, which implies accounting transparency enhances price informativeness. This is 
indicative of more private information flowing to market when accounting numbers are more 
transparent. The results are consistent with theoretical predictions that sound accounting 
transparency encourages the collection of private information, leading the stock prices to be 
                                                          
31
TCAi,t= (∆current asseti,t-∆current liabilitiesi,t- ∆cashi,t + ∆long-term debt in current liabilities-depreciation and 
amortization expense of the firm) / asseti,t-1, where ∆is the first difference (with respect to time) operator. 
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Nondiscretionary accruals is estimated as the fitted value from a regression of total current accruals (TCA) on the 
lagged total firm assets (Asset), the change in sales less the change in receivables (∆REV - ∆REC) and gross 
property plant and equipment (PPE) scaled by lagged total firm assets (Asset).We use the following model to get the 
estimation of the coefficients TCAi,t=α0 + α1 (1 / Asseti,t-1) + α2 (∆REVi,t- ∆RECi,t) + α3 PPEi,t+ єi,t, and then use 
the estimated coefficients to obtain nondiscretionary accruals  in the following equation: NDAi,t=  
′
 +   
′
  (1 / 
Asseti,t-1)+  
′
  (∆REVi,t-∆RECi,t)+  
′
 PPEi,t+ єi,t. Finally, we obtain the first measure of earnings management in 
the equation follwoing: DAi,t= TAi,t- NDAi,t. 
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more informative. Both shareholder coordination measures are significantly positively associated 
with stock price informativeness after controlling for earnings quality. Thus, our results suggest 
that shareholder coordination remains a significant determinant of price informativeness even 
after controlling accounting transparency.  
      4.5.3 Additional robustness checks. In this subsection, we report test results from 
additional robustness checks in Table 2.9. We first estimate our baseline model using the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) regression approach to make sure that our results are not driven by 
errors-in-variables and autocorrelation (Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.9). The coefficient 
estimates have similar economic and statistical significance to those of the panel baseline 
regressions. To obtain standard-error estimates that are more conservative, we cluster standard 
errors by both firm and year to take into account the correlation of residuals across firms and 
over time, as suggested by Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2009). Although, compared with the 
results in baseline regressions, the t-statistics of coefficient estimates on shareholder coordination 
measures shown in Columns (3) and (4) have been attenuated, shareholder coordination 
(COORD_PROX and COORD_PORT) still has a significantly positive impact on price 
informativeness.  
 We further use three-digit industry fixed effects instead of two-digit industry fixed effects 
in our model to ensure that our results are not driven by some unobserved industry characteristics. 
The results in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2.9 show that the impact of shareholder coordination 
on price informativeness remains statistically and economically significant. Using industry fixed 
effects, which use the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry SIC classification scheme delivers 
similar results as reported in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2.9.  
 One remaining concern is that the findings could be driven by a few metropolitan cities 
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with a high concentration of institutional investors. We thus repeat the analysis by excluding 
these cities. For each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and each quarter, we calculate the total 
dollar value of equity holdings that are managed by institutions located in that MSA. We then 
delete institutional investors located in New York and Boston, as both MSAs dominate the 
institutional investors’ landscape, and reconstruct both shareholder coordination measures: 
COORD_PROX and COORD_PORT. Results in Columns (9) and (10) of Table 2.9 indicate that 
the results are again qualitatively unchanged.  
 Literature has shown that geographic proximity to investment opportunities provides 
information advantages for institutional investors to guide their investment and monitoring of 
corporate management (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz (2001); Gaspar and Massa (2007); and Baik, 
Kang, and Kim (2010)). Therefore, local institutional ownership, a proxy for the amount of 
private information, may have a positive impact on stock price informativeness. To rule out the 
possibility that our results merely capture the impact of local institutional ownership, we 
reconstruct the two measures of coordination by excluding institutional investors located within 
150 miles of the firm’s headquarter and re-estimate the baseline model equation (6). The results, 
reported in the last two Columns of Table 2.9, show that the effects of shareholder coordination 
on price informativeness are qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that our findings are not driven 
by local institutions. 
 Taken together, the coefficient on shareholder coordination remains positive and strongly 
positive in all models. Our early findings are confirmed: stronger shareholder coordination is 
strongly associated with more price informativeness. 
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4.6 The Mechanism: Institutioanl Trading 
 Our evidence so far is consistent with the hypothesis that shareholder coordination 
enhances stock price informativeness. In this section, we examine institutional trading as a 
possible underlying mechanism that facilitates this effect. Specifically, we argue that institutional 
trading can serve as a channel of information diffusion between the different nodes of the 
information sharing network that links institutional shareholders. Our conjecture is derived from 
recent evidence identifying investors with similar trading behavior as linked in an empirical 
investor network (Bildik, Ozgul, Walden, and Yavuz (2013)). Moreover, Hartzell and Starks 
(2003) find that institutional investors, rather than retail investors, contribute to private 
information collection and trading. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) provide direct evidence on 
the positive relation between institutional trading and price informativeness.  
 To test whether the institutional trading channel exists, we include institutional trading 
and its interaction term with shareholder coordination in our stock price informativeness model. 
If institutional trading contributes to the private information incorporation into stock prices of 
firms with a high degree of shareholder coordination, we expect to find a positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction variable. Specifically, we use INST to denote the average absolute 
changes in the number of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors as the percentage of 
annual trading volume as reported in 13F filings. The interaction variables between shareholder 
coordination and institutional trading are: COORD_PROX × INST and COORD_PORT × INST. 
 Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.10 report the coefficient estimates using INST without the 
interaction variables COORD_PROX × INST (COORD_PORT × INST). This test serves the 
purpose of verifying whether the relation between shareholder coordination and price 
informativeness is robust to the addition of institutional trading. The results show that the 
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coefficient estimates on both shareholder coordination measures are still positive and significant. 
Consistent with the prior findings, institutional trading is associated with more informative stock 
prices as the coefficient estimate on INST is positive and significant. Columns (3) and (4) of 
Table 2.10 report coefficient estimates for the models that include the interaction terms. As 
expected, the coefficient estimates on the interaction variables are positive and significant, 
supporting our conjecture that the positive relation between shareholder coordination and price 
informativeness is stronger when institutional trading intensifies. As we can see in Columns (3) 
and (4), INST still has a positive, albeit considerably weaker, impact on price informativeness, 
which is consistent with the findings documented in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004). Overall, we 
conclude that results in Table 2.10 provide direct evidence that institutional trading activity 
serves as a mechanism that enables shareholder coordination to enhance price informativeness.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 Although the role of institutional investors in improving corporate governance has been 
recognized by many prior studies, the question whether coordination (i.e. the sharing of 
information and/or resources within a network) among institutional shareholders can improve the 
corporate information environment has not been fully answered.  
 In this paper, we demonstrate that shareholder coordination has implications for stock 
price informativeness. We use geographic proximity between institutional shareholders and the 
correlations between institutional shareholders’ portfolio holdings as the basis for designing two 
alternative measures of shareholder coordination. We find that a higher degree of shareholder 
coordination is associated with more informative stock prices. The positive relation between 
shareholder coordination and price informativeness stands up to a variety of endogeneity tests. In 
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addition, our results are robust to alternative measures of price informativeness and shareholder 
coordination, addition of other control variables, and different regression estimation 
methodologies. We then examine the possible mechanism through which shareholder 
coordination exert its impact on stock price informativeness and provide direct evidence in 
support of the conjecture that institutional trading plays the role of a channel of information 
diffusion between nodes in the network that links institutional investors, thereby facilitating the 
positive relation between coordination and informativeness.  
 Taken together, our results support the notion that a high degree of shareholder 
coordination motivates investors to collect and trade on private information. The diffusion of 
value-relevant information into prices increases price informativeness.  
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper. All variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
sample period is from 1994 to 2010. Financial and utilities industries are omitted (SIC 6000–6999 and 4900–4999). 
All variables are winsorized at bottom and top 1% levels. 
 
 
N Mean Median SD 5th 95th 
Panel A. Stock Price Informativeness Variables 
Ψ 52,865 2.586 2.482 1.872 -0.226 5.837 
Panel B. Alternative Measures of Stock Price Informativeness 
Ψ_MKT 48,624 2.286 2.158 1.566 -0.025 4.990 
PIN 15,486 0.200 0.169 0.109 0.084 0.434 
ADJ_PIN 15,486 0.162 0.143 0.082 0.071 0.327 
AMIHUD_PI 51,214 2.111 0.038 7.616 0.000 10.372 
Panel C. Shareholder Coordination Variables 
COORD_PROX 51,214 -5.975 -6.375 1.197 -6.937 -3.432 
COORD_PORT 51,214 0.290 0.245 0.177 0.094 0.647 
Panel D. Control Variables for Stock Price Informativeness Regressions 
IO 51,214 0.433 0.406 0.284 0.031 0.908 
IO_HHI 51,214 0.021 0.017 0.021 0.001 0.056 
SIZE 51,214 19.373 19.228 1.923 16.452 22.880 
MB 51,214 0.820 0.769 0.853 -0.522 2.334 
ROE 51,214 -0.074 0.070 0.723 -1.095 0.366 
VROE 51,214 0.668 0.121 1.909 0.016 2.997 
LEV 51,214 0.201 0.150 0.209 0.001 0.605 
AGE 51,214 2.527 2.485 0.797 1.099 3.850 
DD 51,214 0.343 0.000 0.475 0.000 1.000 
DIVER 51,214 0.962 1.000 0.192 1.000 1.000 
Panel E. Corporate Governance and Accounting Transparency Variables 
G 15,639 8.962 9.000 2.677 5.000 13.000 
EM_MODJONES 49,536 0.087 0.084 0.064 0.005 0.247 
EM_PERMATCH 49,536 0.100 0.080 0.070 0.006 0.258 
Panel F. Institutional Trading Variable 
INST 51,214 0.124 0.074 0.209 0.014 0.362 
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Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the main variables. Pearson correlations are shown. Numbers in bold are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. 
 
 
Correlation Matrix  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Ψ 1.000 
                
(2) Ψ_MKT 0.753 1.000 
               
(3) PIN 0.589 0.572 1.000 
              
(4) ADJPIN 0.586 0.561 0.749 1.000 
             
(5) AMIHUD_PI 0.299 0.333 0.350 0.279 1.000 
            
(6) COORD_PROX 0.389 0.381 0.488 0.428 0.316 1.000 
           
(7) COORD_PORT 0.615 0.572 0.606 0.561 0.339 0.648 1.000 
          
(8) IO -0.583 -0.557 -0.468 -0.437 -0.248 -0.466 -0.564 1.000 
         
(9) IO_HHI -0.204 -0.210 -0.038 -0.031 -0.094 -0.199 -0.073 0.626 1.000 
        
(10) SIZE -0.740 -0.658 -0.642 -0.638 -0.346 -0.500 -0.720 0.619 0.180 1.000 
       
(11) MB -0.254 -0.218 -0.341 -0.331 -0.197 -0.181 -0.209 0.023 -0.058 0.406 1.000 
      
(12) ROE -0.130 -0.110 -0.060 -0.049 -0.081 -0.095 -0.128 0.142 0.051 0.196 -0.090 1.000 
     
(13) VROE 0.080 0.069 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.072 0.110 -0.136 -0.034 -0.108 0.217 -0.175 1.000 
    
(14) LEV 0.001 0.000 0.041 0.039 0.014 0.032 0.028 0.038 0.091 0.048 -0.029 0.055 0.139 1.000 
   
(15) AGE -0.247 -0.203 -0.111 -0.141 -0.046 -0.037 -0.238 0.280 0.076 0.267 -0.135 0.134 -0.131 0.033 1.000 
  
(16) DD -0.163 -0.142 -0.179 -0.179 -0.077 -0.089 -0.171 0.133 0.004 0.277 0.013 0.104 -0.038 0.103 0.351 1.000 
 
(17) DIVER 0.132 0.113 0.081 0.081 0.031 0.044 0.103 -0.108 -0.040 -0.146 -0.002 -0.027 0.018 -0.058 -0.099 -0.060 1.000 
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Table 2.3 The Effect of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the panel regression where the dependent variable is the logistic 
transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ).The main independent variables are the proxies for shareholder 
coordination measured by the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance between institutional 
shareholders (COORD_PROX) and the weighted average correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock 
holdings (COORD_PORT). Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the first 
two-digit SIC code) and year dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using 
standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test 
significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
COORD_PROXt-1 0.604*** 0.094*** 0.037***    
 
(60.88) (12.61) (4.73) 
   
COORD_PORTt-1    
5.662*** 1.618*** 1.407*** 
    
(52.05) (21.53) (18.94) 
IOt-1   
-1.428*** 
  
-1.141*** 
   
(-27.18) 
  
(-21.61) 
IO_HHIt-1   
7.533*** 
  
4.299*** 
   
(13.81) 
  
(7.65) 
SIZEt-1  
-0.617*** -0.514*** 
 
-0.541*** -0.455*** 
  
(-88.15) (-63.29) 
 
(-66.94) (-53.16) 
MBt-1  
-0.602*** -0.574*** 
 
-0.556*** -0.534*** 
  
(-59.87) (-54.97) 
 
(-55.35) (-51.22) 
ROEt-1  
-0.113*** -0.105*** 
 
-0.112*** -0.105*** 
  
(-10.54) (-9.48) 
 
(-10.76) (-9.63) 
VROEt-1  
0.027*** 0.021*** 
 
0.023*** 0.019*** 
  
(5.83) (4.31) 
 
(5.00) (3.92) 
LEVt-1  
1.119*** 1.071*** 
 
0.956*** 0.930*** 
  
(26.33) (22.49) 
 
(22.79) (19.90) 
AGEt-1  
0.075*** 0.091*** 
 
0.089*** 0.094*** 
  
(5.62) (6.21) 
 
(6.95) (6.54) 
DDt-1  
0.049*** 0.027 
 
0.040** 0.019 
  
(2.61) (1.38) 
 
(2.17) (0.98) 
DIVERt-1  
-0.092** -0.058 
 
-0.081** -0.047 
  
(-2.14) (-1.42) 
 
(-1.98) (-1.19) 
Constant 7.714*** 7.456*** 6.940*** 1.932*** 5.913*** 5.893*** 
 
(80.18) (80.84) (73.00) (23.88) (60.29) (60.43) 
       
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 52,865 51,214 51,214 52,865 51,214 51,214 
Adj. R-squared 0.351 0.640 0.664 0.484 0.649 0.670 
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 Table 13 The Effect of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness: 
Different types of Institutional Investors  
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the panel regression where the dependent variable is the logistic 
transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ). In Columns (1) and (3), the main independent variables are 
shareholder coordination measured among independent (COORD_IND) and grey institutional shareholders 
(COORD_GREY), respectively. In Columns (2) and (4), the main independent variables are shareholder 
coordination measured among dedicated (COORD_DED) and transient institutional shareholders (COORD_TRA), 
respectively. Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) 
and year dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  
 COORD_PROX COORD_PORT 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
COORD_INDt-1 0.031***  
0.522*** 
 
 
(4.70) 
 
(9.84) 
 
COORD_GREYt-1 0.017**  
0.066 
 
 
(2.58) 
 
(0.58) 
 
COORD_DEDt-1  
0.046*** 
 
0.543*** 
  
(7.56) 
 
(2.76) 
COORD_TRAt-1  
-0.007 
 
-0.078 
  
(-1.40) 
 
(-0.64) 
IOt-1 -1.447*** -1.443*** -1.457*** -1.477*** 
 
(-27.71) (-27.96) (-28.17) (-28.46) 
IO_HHIt-1 7.541*** 7.469*** 7.324*** 7.574*** 
 
(13.83) (13.71) (13.44) (13.89) 
SIZEt-1 -0.516*** -0.523*** -0.510*** -0.521*** 
 
(-64.26) (-66.55) (-63.92) (-65.93) 
MBt-1 -0.578*** -0.577*** -0.573*** -0.580*** 
 
(-55.88) (-56.55) (-56.29) (-56.93) 
ROEt-1 -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.109*** -0.107*** 
 
(-9.49) (-9.56) (-9.83) (-9.57) 
VROEt-1 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
(4.33) (4.39) (4.31) (4.32) 
LEVt-1 1.082*** 1.098*** 1.071*** 1.096*** 
 
(22.71) (23.08) (22.58) (22.96) 
AGEt-1 0.098*** 0.068*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 
 
(6.69) (4.42) (6.48) (6.63) 
DIVERt-1 0.028 0.023 0.031 0.027 
 
(1.40) (1.18) (1.62) (1.40) 
DDt-1 -0.058 -0.060 -0.056 -0.061 
 
(-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.39) (-1.48) 
Constant 7.001*** 6.999*** 6.642*** 6.744*** 
 
(69.18) (69.93) (75.62) (77.13) 
     
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 51,198 51,198 51,198 51,198 
Adj. R-squared 0.664 0.665 0.666 0.664 
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Table 2.5 Endogeneity Test: Change-on-Change Regressions 
 
This table shows estimates of change-on-change regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is 
changes in logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (ΔΨ) from year t-1 to year t. The main independent 
variables are lagged changes in geographic-proximity-based (ΔCOORD_PROX) and portfolio-correlation-based 
shareholder coordination (ΔCOORD_PORT) from year t-2 to year t-1, respectively. In Columns (3) and (4), the 
main dependent variables are changes in geographic-proximity-based (ΔCOORD_PROX) and 
portfolio-correlation-based shareholder coordination (ΔCOORD_PORT) from year t-1 to year t, respectively. The 
main independent variable is lagged changes in logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (ΔΨ) from year 
t-2 to year t-1. Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) 
and year dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
        ΔΨt                  ΔCOORD_PROXt     ΔCOORD_PORTt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ΔCOORD_PROXt-1 0.045*    
 
(1.73) 
   
ΔCOORD_PORTt-1  
0.381*** 
  
  
(3.54) 
  
ΔΨt-1   
0.002 0.000 
   
(0.93) (0.26) 
ΔIOt-1 0.211*** 0.418*** 0.010 -0.027*** 
 
(2.58) (5.18) (0.36) (-3.51) 
ΔIO_HHIt-1 -0.411 -1.111 -0.383* 0.043 
 
(-0.61) (-1.64) (-1.94) (0.82) 
ΔSIZEt-1 -0.274*** -0.347*** -0.006 0.003 
 
(-11.94) (-18.39) (-1.02) (1.50) 
ΔMBt-1 -0.358*** -0.066*** 0.033*** 0.010*** 
 
(-27.72) (-3.54) (5.77) (5.78) 
ΔROEt-1 -0.086*** -0.024* 0.010*** 0.003*** 
 
(-7.00) (-1.90) (2.65) (3.24) 
ΔVROEt-1 0.023*** 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
(2.90) (0.32) (0.94) (1.43) 
ΔLEVt-1 -0.070 -0.073 -0.040* -0.028*** 
 
(-0.96) (-1.00) (-1.94) (-4.41) 
ΔAGEt-1 -0.144* -0.190*** -0.203*** -0.084*** 
 
(-1.93) (-2.59) (-6.07) (-8.14) 
ΔDDt-1 -0.027 -0.019 -0.006 -0.000 
 
(-0.91) (-0.65) (-0.79) (-0.08) 
ΔDIVER t-1 0.016 0.021 0.017 0.003 
 
(0.33) (0.41) (1.36) (1.03) 
Constant -0.352*** -0.344*** -0.017** 0.001 
 
(-13.99) (-13.85) (-2.47) (0.57) 
     
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 43,785 43,785 42,218 42,218 
Adj. R-squared 0.122 0.129 0.045 0.022 
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Table 2.6 Endogeneity Test: Other Methods  
 
This table reports the results of other endogeneity tests. In Columns (1) and (2), we estimate the baseline model with 
firm fixed effect. In Columns (3) and (4), we use residual geographic-proximity-based (COORD_PROX_RES) and 
portfolio-correlation-based shareholder coordination (COORD_PORT_RES) instead of raw shareholder 
coordination measures, respectively. In Columns (5) and (6), we instrument for both shareholder coordination 
measures using a series of binary variables that represent firms’ headquarters location dummies of the major 21 
cities or metropolitan areas in the US plus a dummy for a firm located in a remote city. A remote city is defined as a 
city located more than 150 miles away from one of the 21 major cities. In Columns (7) and (8), we report the 
regression results using the GMM method. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the logistic transformed 
relative idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ). Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the 
first two-digit SIC code) and year dummies are included except for results in Columns (1) and (2). Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Firm FE Residual Coordination IV GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         COORD_PROXt-1 0.031***    
0.448** 
 
0.140** 
 
 
(3.32) 
   
(2.04) 
 
(2.22) 
 
COORD_PORTt-1 
 
0.620*** 
   
9.859*** 
 
1.046** 
  
(6.62) 
   
(3.51) 
 
(2.41) 
COORD_PROX_RESt-1  
0.020** 
     
   
(2.01) 
     
COORD_PORT_RESt-1   
0.730*** 
    
    
(9.52) 
    
IVt-1       
0.335*** 0.355*** 
       
(2.74) (2.70) 
IVt-2 
      
0.031 0.027 
       
(1.08) (0.91) 
IOt-1 -0.720*** -0.893*** -1.483*** -1.367*** -0.592*** -1.693*** -0.438** -0.419 
 
(-10.97) (-11.69) (-27.58) (-25.65) (-5.76) (-6.47) (-2.04) (-1.11) 
IO_HHIt-1 2.735*** 2.218*** 7.631*** 6.113*** -0.421 -6.862*** 1.402*** 0.389 
 
(3.99) (3.34) (13.34) (11.62) (-0.59) (-3.20) (2.77) (0.13) 
SIZEt-1 -0.561*** -0.492*** -0.522*** -0.561*** -0.490*** -0.274*** -0.283*** -0.264*** 
 
(-36.44) (-30.99) (-63.94) (-69.07) (-37.63) (-3.30) (-3.58) (-3.35) 
MBt-1 -0.079*** -0.092*** -0.594*** -0.086*** -0.533*** -0.104*** 0.007 0.024 
 
(-4.94) (-5.84) (-55.37) (-7.14) (-22.23) (-7.41) (0.10) (0.36) 
ROEt-1 -0.026** -0.028** -0.121*** -0.001 -0.098*** -0.033** -0.966*** -0.845*** 
 
(-2.17) (-2.38) (-9.75) (-0.06) (-7.72) (-2.42) (-4.93) (-4.33) 
VROEt-1 0.001 -0.001 0.027*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.006 -0.060*** -0.056*** 
 
(0.09) (-0.10) (4.65) (0.39) (4.52) (1.23) (-3.16) (-3.13) 
LEVt-1 0.017 -0.003 1.104*** 0.157*** 0.970*** 0.113** -0.173 -0.329 
 
(0.27) (-0.05) (21.59) (3.36) (14.83) (2.24) (-0.66) (-1.32) 
AGE t-1 0.136*** 0.183*** 0.096*** 0.059*** 0.031 0.119*** 0.150*** 0.142*** 
 
(2.73) (3.67) (6.29) (4.13) (1.06) (4.74) (4.02) (3.98) 
DDt-1 -0.017 -0.024 0.037* 0.041** 0.017 0.003 -0.065 -0.059 
 
(-0.62) (-0.91) (1.80) (2.12) (0.85) (0.14) (-0.72) (-0.65) 
DIVERt-1 0.042 0.048 -0.061 -0.030 -0.055 -0.045 -0.092 -0.082 
 
(0.84) (0.97) (-1.49) (-0.78) (-1.31) (-1.06) (-1.02) (-0.97) 
Constant 14.008*** 12.706*** 6.731*** 14.578*** 9.305*** 7.689*** 5.196*** 5.524*** 
 
(47.47) (39.26) (74.88) (91.15) (5.91) (3.49) (3.04) (3.28) 
         YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FE YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
First-stage F statistics (p-value) 
   
0.000 0.038 
  
Hansen test (p-value) 
    
0.556 0.317 0.648 0.350 
Serial correlation test (p-value) 
     
0.476 0.915 
Observations 51,214 51,214 48,949 48,949 51,214 51,214 42,561 42,561 
Adj. R-squared 0.744 0.746 0.664 0.484 0.544 0.496 - - 
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Table 2.7 Baseline Model Estimates Using Alternative Stock Price Informativeness Measures 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of panel regressions with alternative stock price informativeness measures. Columns (1) and (2) use the logistic 
transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility estimated by Fama and French (1992) three-factor model of returns. Columns (3) and (4) use the annual probability 
of information-based trading (PIN) of Easley et al. (2002). Columns (5) and (6) use the annual adjusted PIN (ADJ_PIN) of Duarte and Young (2009). Columns (7) 
and (8) use the price impact measure of Amihud (2002). Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) 
and year dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  Ψ_MKTt PINt ADJ_PINt AMIHUD_PIt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
COORD_PROXt-1 0.071*** 
 
0.017*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
1.201*** 
 
 
(8.39) 
 
(9.28) 
 
(5.90) 
 
(13.71) 
 COORD_PORTt-1 
 
1.391*** 
 
0.177*** 
 
0.081*** 
 
10.916*** 
 
 
(17.97) 
 
(11.81) 
 
(6.68) 
 
(15.00) 
IO t-1 -1.347*** -1.121*** -0.090*** -0.079*** -0.057*** -0.054*** -1.908*** -1.126*** 
 
(-24.68) (-20.58) (-10.60) (-9.77) (-9.98) (-9.34) (-6.43) (-3.80) 
IO_HHI t-1 6.023*** 3.004*** 0.646*** 0.301*** 0.441*** 0.286*** -0.160 -21.642*** 
 
(10.70) (5.19) (5.84) (2.82) (6.21) (3.93) (-0.04) (-5.33) 
SIZE t-1 -0.351*** -0.299*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.655*** -0.371*** 
 
(-42.94) (-34.36) (-18.82) (-12.65) (-23.99) (-18.16) (-14.70) (-7.70) 
MB t-1 -0.395*** -0.361*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -1.434*** -1.299*** 
 
(-36.21) (-33.18) (-16.67) (-14.34) (-18.28) (-16.47) (-19.24) (-17.02) 
ROE t-1 -0.060*** -0.060*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.005** -0.491*** -0.512*** 
 
(-5.44) (-5.52) (2.22) (3.11) (2.09) (2.45) (-6.34) (-6.58) 
VROE t-1 0.009* 0.006 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.045 0.027 
 
(1.94) (1.37) (-2.78) (-3.18) (-3.26) (-3.57) (1.30) (0.78) 
LEV t-1 0.719*** 0.607*** 0.036*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 2.365*** 1.932*** 
 
(14.62) (12.55) (4.78) (3.78) (6.25) (5.59) (7.28) (6.00) 
AGE t-1 0.105*** 0.113*** 0.004** 0.007*** 0.001 0.002* 0.178** 0.350*** 
 
(7.00) (7.80) (2.21) (3.58) (0.71) (1.71) (2.09) (4.17) 
DIVER t-1 -0.021 -0.027 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.041 
 
(-0.99) (-1.33) (-0.46) (-0.60) (-0.27) (-0.35) (0.04) (-0.36) 
DD t-1 -0.035 -0.026 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.000 -0.016 0.013 
 
(-0.85) (-0.64) (1.24) (1.54) (-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.09) (0.07) 
Constant 5.850*** 4.633*** 0.480*** 0.283*** 0.372*** 0.277*** 14.127*** 1.166* 
 
(66.49) (51.03) (33.96) (20.48) (31.88) (25.10) (19.47) (1.92) 
         YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 48,624 48,624 15,486 15,486 15,486 15,486 51,214 51,214 
Adj. R-squared  0.563 0.569 0.494 0.499 0.472 0.472 0.188 0.190 
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Table 2.8 The Effect of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness: 
Controlling for Corporate Governance and Accounting Transparency  
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the panel regression controlling for corporate governance and 
institutional trading. The dependent variable is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ). The 
main independent variables are the proxies for shareholder coordination measured by the inverse of the weighted 
average of the geographic distance between institutional shareholders (COORD_PROX) and the weighted average 
correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings (COORD_PORT). G is the IRRC-Gompers et al. (2003) 
governance index. The first accounting transparency measure is measured by the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals estimated by the modified Jones model, EM_MODJONES, (Dechow et al.(1995)). The second accounting 
transparency measure is measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated the performance 
matched model, EM_PERMATCH, (Kothari et al. (2005)). Detailed variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. 
Both industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) and year dummies are included. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, 
and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
COORD_PROXt-1 0.198*** 0.025** 0.024**    
 
(5.35) (2.20) (2.00) 
   
COORD_PORTt-1  
  3.540*** 1.291*** 1.299*** 
  
  (15.40) (11.17) (10.66) 
Gt-1 0.002   0.004  
 
 
(0.29)   (0.82)  
 EM_MODJONESt-1  
-0.061***  
 
-0.060*** 
  
(-4.25)  
 
(-4.20)  
EM_PERMATCHt-1   -0.041***   -0.040*** 
   (-5.44)   (-5.38) 
IO t-1 -0.720*** -1.409*** -1.454*** -0.441*** -1.133*** -1.176*** 
 
(-7.99) (-22.38) (-24.75) (-5.06) (-17.87) (-19.35) 
IO_HHI t-1 4.042*** 7.592*** 7.632*** -2.351** 4.625*** 4.662*** 
 
(4.68) (13.27) (12.87) (-2.57) (7.11) (6.85) 
SIZE t-1 -0.439*** -0.519*** -0.517*** -0.346*** -0.462*** -0.459*** 
 
(-32.38) (-59.27) (-58.12) (-23.51) (-48.03) (-47.53) 
MB t-1 -0.505*** -0.563*** -0.567*** -0.430*** -0.523*** -0.526*** 
 
(-24.79) (-47.18) (-45.83) (-21.31) (-43.47) (-42.01) 
ROE t-1 -0.062*** -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.047** -0.109*** -0.105*** 
 
(-2.59) (-9.24) (-8.63) (-2.00) (-9.47) (-8.92) 
VROE t-1 0.066*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.058*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
(5.43) (4.38) (4.40) (4.91) (4.05) (4.05) 
LEV t-1 1.046*** 1.038*** 1.012*** 0.837*** 0.892*** 0.860*** 
 
(11.68) (16.16) (15.21) (9.71) (13.81) (12.95) 
AGE t-1 0.028 0.110*** 0.099*** 0.024 0.112*** 0.100*** 
 
(1.05) (5.55) (5.56) (0.95) (5.65) (5.80) 
DD t-1 0.031 0.033 0.044** 0.028 0.025 0.037* 
 
(1.00) (1.41) (1.96) (0.93) (1.09) (1.69) 
DIVER t-1 -0.077 -0.093** -0.093* -0.057 -0.077* -0.077* 
 
(-1.53) (-1.99) (-1.93) (-1.19) (-1.76) (-1.71) 
Constant 7.229*** 6.856*** 6.909*** 4.442*** 5.928*** 5.982*** 
 
(24.54) (58.46) (56.12) (21.27) (53.30) (52.04) 
  
  
 
  
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 15,639 49,536 49,536 15,639 49,536 49,536 
Adj. R-squared 0.598 0.665 0.669 0.613 0.670 0.674 
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Table 2.9 The Effect of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness: Robustness Checks 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the panel regression where the dependent variable is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility 
(Ψ).The main independent variables are the proxies for shareholder coordination measured by the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance 
between institutional shareholders (COORD_PROX) and the weighted average correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings (COORD_PORT). 
Columns (1) and (2) report results using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation approach with estimates given by annual cross-sectional firm-level regressions. 
Columns (3) and (4) report results using the Peterson (2009) estimation approach with estimates clustered by firm and year. Columns (5) and (6) report results 
using 3-digit SIC industry classification scheme as industry fixed effect. Columns (7) and (8) report results using Fama-French (1997) 48 industry SIC 
classification scheme as industry fixed effect. Columns (9) and (10) use shareholder coordination measures constructed without institutions located in New York 
City and Boston. Columns (11) and (12) use shareholder coordination measures constructed without local institutions. Detailed variable definitions are listed in 
Appendix A. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
  Fama-MacBeth  Two-way clustering  
Industry FE 
 (3-digit SIC code) 
Industry FE 
 (Fama-French 48 industry ) 
Coordination  
(without New York and Boston) 
Coordination (without 
local institutions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
           
  
COORD_PROXt-1 0.071***  
0.042** 
 
0.033*** 
 
0.035*** 
 
0.056*** 
 
0.022***  
 
(4.54) 
 
(2.02) 
 
(4.32) 
 
(4.53) 
 
(8.23) 
 
(2.96)  
COORD_PORTt-1 
 
1.641*** 
 
1.407*** 
 
1.357*** 
 
1.408*** 
 
0.130**  0.461*** 
  
(6.93) 
 
(6.18) 
 
(18.57) 
 
(19.09) 
 
(2.28)  (5.07) 
IOt-1 -1.347*** -1.039*** -1.419*** -1.141*** -1.410*** -1.135*** -1.438*** -1.149*** -1.405*** -1.469*** -1.457*** -1.384*** 
 
(-11.17) (-12.32) (-11.77) (-12.44) (-27.50) (-22.03) (-27.70) (-22.05) (-26.93) (-28.22) (-27.63) (-24.94) 
IO_HHIt-1 6.920*** 3.422*** 7.504*** 4.299*** 7.391*** 4.295*** 7.551*** 4.325*** 7.232*** 7.610*** 7.635*** 6.912*** 
 
(12.92) (5.43) (11.47) (6.02) (13.84) (7.79) (13.68) (7.63) (13.27) (13.89) (13.94) (12.01) 
SIZEt-1 -0.507*** -0.449*** -0.514*** -0.455*** -0.511*** -0.453*** -0.515*** -0.456*** -0.514*** -0.519*** -0.517*** -0.503*** 
 
(-46.76) (-30.61) (-42.92) (-30.74) (-62.55) (-53.09) (-64.79) (-54.43) (-64.62) (-64.31) (-63.65) (-57.78) 
MBt-1 -0.549*** -0.512*** -0.573*** -0.534*** -0.575*** -0.536*** -0.574*** -0.534*** -0.572*** -0.579*** -0.578*** -0.567*** 
 
(-31.08) (-25.12) (-21.23) (-18.80) (-56.48) (-52.70) (-54.87) (-51.14) (-55.64) (-56.40) (-55.45) (-53.91) 
ROEt-1 -0.123*** -0.124*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.110*** -0.109*** -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 
(-8.36) (-8.44) (-5.64) (-5.60) (-10.09) (-10.18) (-9.47) (-9.56) (-9.38) (-9.57) (-9.47) (-9.44) 
VROEt-1 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 
(4.95) (4.81) (3.61) (3.51) (4.19) (3.82) (3.95) (3.55) (4.24) (4.36) (4.31) (4.31) 
LEVt-1 1.026*** 0.876*** 1.068*** 0.930*** 1.027*** 0.893*** 1.068*** 0.928*** 1.073*** 1.089*** 1.090*** 1.049*** 
 
(22.65) (14.61) (18.88) (14.91) (21.51) (19.10) (22.53) (20.00) (22.50) (22.80) (22.56) (21.38) 
AGEt-1 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.090*** 0.094*** 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 
 
(4.61) (4.50) (4.35) (4.84) (5.91) (6.27) (6.59) (6.98) (6.46) (6.56) (6.32) (6.60) 
DDt-1 0.022 0.015 0.027 0.019 -0.001 -0.007 0.024 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.027 
 
(0.84) (0.59) (0.84) (0.59) (-0.03) (-0.38) (1.25) (0.85) (1.41) (1.41) (1.51) (1.39) 
DIVERt-1 -0.044 -0.051 -0.058 -0.047 -0.031 -0.021 -0.041 -0.030 -0.058 -0.060 -0.057 -0.055 
 
(-1.20) (-1.56) (-1.43) (-1.19) (-0.77) (-0.55) (-1.01) (-0.77) (-1.42) (-1.46) (-1.39) (-1.36) 
Constant 6.144*** 4.865*** 6.859*** 5.771*** 6.904*** 5.903*** 6.905*** 5.866*** 7.006*** 6.711*** 4.862*** 4.514*** 
 
(37.42) (17.75) (25.52) (30.90) (74.03) (61.39) (72.99) (60.41) (76.41) (75.32) (63.81) (53.66) 
YEAR FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 50,813 50,813 
Adj. R-squared  0.580 0.590 0.665 0.671 0.674 0.680 0.665 0.671 0.666 0.665 0.665 0.666 
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Table 2.10 The Effect of Shareholder Coordination on Stock Price Informativeness: the 
Role of Institutional Trading 
 
This table reports estimates of coefficients of the panel regression controlling for institutional trading. The 
dependent variable is the logistic transformed relative idiosyncratic volatility (Ψ). The main independent variables 
are shareholder coordination (COORD_PROX and COORD_PORT), institutional trading (INST) and the interaction 
term between them (COORD_PROX×INST and COORD_PORT×INST). INST is the absolute change in the 
number of shares held by institutions as a fraction of annual trading volume. Detailed variable definitions are listed 
in Appendix A. Both industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code) and year dummies are included. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two-tailed test significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
COORD_PROXt-1×INSTt-1  
0.043** 
 
   
(2.43) 
 
COORD_PORTt-1× INSTt-1   
0.470*** 
    
(3.25) 
INSTt-1 2.413*** 2.125*** 0.572*** 0.149*** 
 (24.01) (21.07) (5.32) (2.76) 
COORD_PROXt-1 0.030***  
0.021* 
 
 
(3.83) 
 
(1.89) 
 
COORD_PORTt-1  
1.148*** 
 
1.203*** 
  
(16.04) 
 
(10.41) 
IOt-1 -1.225*** -1.017*** -1.353*** -1.084*** 
 
(-24.05) (-19.82) (-21.55) (-17.21) 
IO_HHIt-1 5.018*** 2.689*** 6.531*** 3.496*** 
 
(9.86) (5.11) (11.56) (5.50) 
SIZEt-1 -0.481*** -0.437*** -0.518*** -0.462*** 
 
(-61.28) (-52.73) (-59.29) (-48.20) 
MBt-1 -0.535*** -0.507*** -0.559*** -0.521*** 
 
(-53.59) (-50.59) (-47.73) (-44.25) 
ROEt-1 -0.118*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 
(-10.78) (-10.74) (-10.26) (-10.43) 
VROEt-1 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 
(4.93) (4.53) (4.82) (4.45) 
LEVt-1 0.974*** 0.873*** 1.043*** 0.899*** 
 
(21.45) (19.41) (16.57) (14.24) 
AGEt-1 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 
 
(4.49) (4.95) (4.93) (5.08) 
DD t-1 0.010 0.006 0.025 0.019 
 
(0.57) (0.33) (1.05) (0.82) 
DIVERt-1 -0.056 -0.047 -0.081* -0.062 
 
(-1.44) (-1.24) (-1.95) (-1.58) 
Constant 6.563*** 5.754*** 6.734*** 5.869*** 
 
(69.62) (60.05) (58.95) (54.06) 
     
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES 
INDUSTRY FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 51,214 51,214 51,214 51,214 
Adj. R-squared 0.675 0.678 0.667 0.672 
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Appendix A: Definition of Variables 
 
Variables Definition  
Panel A. Stock Price Informativeness Variables 
Logistic relative Idiosyncratic Volatility  Ψ Annual logistic transformed relative volatility estimated from Fama and French (1992) three 
factor model 
Panel B. Alternative Measures of Stock Price Informativeness 
Logistic relative Idiosyncratic Volatility, 
alternative 
Ψ_MKT Annual logistic transformed relative volatility estimated from the expanded market model with 
Fama-French 48 industry returns (Cheng, Goldstein and Jiang (2007)) 
Probability of information-based trading PIN Annual probability of information-based trading of Easley et al. (2002) 
Adjusted probability of information-based 
trading 
ADJ_PIN The annual component of PIN related to asymmetric information according to Duarte and 
Young (2009) 
Amihud price impact AMIHUD_PI Average daily ratio of a stock absolute return by the dollar volume (Amihud (2002)). 
Panel C. Shareholder Coordination Variables 
Geographic-proximity-based shareholder 
coordination  
COORD_PROX The inverse of the average of log(1+weighted-average geographic distance between 
institutional shareholders of the firm) in each firm-quarter in  year t-1, where weight is the 
ratio of ownership held by institution i to the total ownership held by all institutions in firm b at 
quarter q 
Portfolio-correlation-based shareholder 
coordination 
COORD_PORT The average of the weighted average correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock 
holdings (relative to the weight in the market portfolio) in each firm-quarter in  year t-1, where 
weight is the ratio of ownership held by institution i to the total ownership held by all 
institutions in firm b at quarter q 
Coordination among independent 
institutions 
COORD_IND Shareholder coordination measured among independent institutions (mutual funds and 
independent investment advisors) 
Coordination among grey institutions COORD_GREY Shareholder coordination measured among grey institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, 
and other institutions) 
Coordination among dedicated institutions COORD_DED Shareholder coordination measured among dedicated institutions (as defined in Bushee (2001))   
Coordination among transient institutions COORD_TRA Shareholder coordination measured among transient institutions (as defined in Bushee (2001))   
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Panel D. Control Variables for Stock Pice Informativeness Regressions  
Institutional ownership IO The average percentage of aggregated share holdings by institutional investors to total shares 
outstanding in year t-1 
Institutional ownership concentration IO_HHI  Herfindahl Index of institutional ownership concentration based on the percentages of 
institutional holdings by all 13F institutions (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). 
Market capitalization  SIZE Annual Market capitalization (COMPUSTAT#25 × COMPUSTAT #199) 
Market-to-book ratio MB Log of the market-to-book ratio (COMPUSTAT#25 × COMPUSTAT #199) / 
(COMPUSTAT#60) 
Return on equity ROE Return on equity calculated as earnings before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT#18) 
divided by book value of equity (COMPUSTAT#60) by the end of prior year 
Volatility of return on equity VROE Sample variance of annual ROE over the last 3 years 
Leverage LEV The ratio of long-term debt (COMPUSTAT#10) to total assets (COMPUSTAT#6) 
Firm age AGE Log age defined as the number of years since the stock was included in the CRSP database 
Dividend dummy DD Annual dividend dummy, which equals 1 if the firm pays dividends, and 0 otherwise 
(COMPUSTAT #201>0) 
Diversification dummy DIVER Annual dummy variable that equals 1 when a firm operates in multiple segments, and 0 
otherwise 
Panel E. Corporate Governance and Accounting Transparency Variables 
Governance index G IRRC-Gompers et al. (2003) governance index, which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions 
Earnings Management, first version  EM_MODJONES Absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated by using modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995) 
Earnings Management, alternative version EM_PERMATCH Absolute value of performance matched discretionary accruals based on the difference of 
accruals from modified Jones model between the target firm and matched firm with the same 
two-digit SIC code and with closest return on assets in the current year (Kothari et al. (2005)) 
Panel F. Institutional Trading Variable 
Institutional trading INST Annual average of quarterly absolute change in the number of shares held by institutions, as a 
fraction of annual trading volume  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
